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REGULATION OF MIDWIVES AS HOME
BIRTH ATTENDANTS
Childbirth practices have become the focus of worldwide debate
and controversy among both medical professionals and laypeople.'
Controversy particularly surrounds the regulation of home births
and midwives. Proponents of home birth argue that birth in the
home is not only psychologically beneficial to both mother and baby,
but also that the home is the safest place to give birth. 2 Midwives,
rather than physicians, usually assist home births. 8 Midwives rec-
ognize birth as a normal physiological process and avoid unneces-
sary intervention.''
Opponents of home birth argue that it is infinitely more risky,
to both mother and baby, to give birth at home. 5 Physicians and
obstetricians in the United States traditionally oppose home births.
Unlike midwives, they urge that childbirth is inherently dangerous
and that technological intervention in a controlled institutional en-
vironment can reduce its risk.'
Women, the consumers of maternity care, express a desire for
more humanized childbirth.' Hospital childbirth traditionally shifts
power from the mother to her childbirth assistants. 8 Dissatisfaction
with hospital births because of this feeling of powerlessness sparked
a revival of "natural" childbirth in the 1960s. 9 Today, a significant
number of well educated and informed consumers choose planned
home births assisted by midwives."' Thus, numerous philosophies
Zander, Maternity Care An Internalional Perspective, 31 J. OF NURSE-MIDWIFERY, Sept./
Oct. 1986 at 227.
2 Rantz, Letter to the Editor, HasTiNcs CENTER REPORT, October 1986 at 43 (discussing
article appearing in previous issue). Home birth advocates argue that risks caused by medical
professionals and the hospital environment outweigh the risk of limited access to emergency
services posed by home births, Hoff & Schneiderman, Having Babies at Home: Is 11 Safe? Is 11
Ethical?, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 21 December 1985 at 19, 21.
See Amicus Curiae Brief for the Midwives Alliance of North America at 21-22, Leigh
v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 395 Mass. 670, 481 N.E.2d 1347 (1985) (No. 3857).
[hereinafter MANA 14R1
1 Zander, supra note 1, at 230.
5 Hoff & Schneiderman, supra note 2, at 19.
" Zander, supra note 1, at 228, 23(}.
7 See J. LITOFF, TtiE AMERICAN MIDWIFE DEBATE 13-14 (1986); Hoff & Schneiderman,
supra note 2, at 22.
8 1...rroFr, MrnwIEE DEBATE, ROM note 7, at 13 —14.
" Id.
10 MANA BRIEF, supra note 3, at 21.
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478	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:477
and perspectives compete in the debate over midwives and home
birth.
The competing philosophies in the debate over midwives and
home birth originate, in part, in the history of midwifery. In Amer-
ica, the term midwife summons images ranging from the supersti-
tious, ignorant peasant woman of medieval times to the trained,
highly skilled professionals found in Great Britain and other coun-
tries in western Europe." For centuries midwifery remained, exclu-
sively a female domain.' 2 Childbearing and assisting at birth were
considered by most members of society to be the necessary and
unavoidable duties of women.' 3 In England during the eighteenth
century, however, men started displacing women from their roles
as birth attendants. This trend resulted from significant advances
in British, male-dominated medicine which promised safer child-
birth." Following the British trend, male physicians almost com-
pletely replaced midwives at the deliveries of upper-class and mid-
dle-class urban women in America by the early nineteenth century.' 3
Throughout this period, critics unsuccessfully attempted to reclaim
obstetrics for the midwivesi°
Physicians now attend the deliveries of the vast majority of all
classes of women in the United States. 17 Additionally, physicians
traditionally oppose home births, arguing that home births are
unsafe. 18 Because physicians attend the majority of births and tra-
ditionally oppose home births,'• over ninety-nine percent of all
births in 1970 occurred in an institutional setting. 2°
While physicians continue attending the majority of births, the
number of births attended by midwives increased significantly be-
" J. DONEGAN, WOMEN & MEN MIDWIVES 3 (1978).
12 1d. at 9.
0 Id.
14 Id. at 4.
° Id.
' 6 Id. at 5.
TAFFEL, VITAL AND HEALTII STATISTICS U.S. DEPT. OF HEAUrli AND HUMAN SERVICES,
PUB. No. (PHS) 84-1918, SERIES 21, No. 40 MIDWIFE AND OUT-OF-HOSPITAL DELIVERIES,
UNITED STATES 17 (1984). [ here inafl STATisTics] By 1910 midwives attended approximately
fifty percent of all births in the United States. J. LITOFF, AMERICAN MIDWIVES 1860 co 'rue
PRESENT 27 (1978). This figure includes home and hospital births. This figure declined to
0.9 percent of all births by 1975 (0.6 at hospital, 0.3 not at hospital). STATisTics, supra, at 17.
im Zander, supra note 1, at 228, 230.
19 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
zo
 STA-Hs-tics, supra note 17, at 4. The majority of births in the United States occurred
at home until about 1940. Id. Home births declined tremendously From this level to a low of
0.6 percent of all births in 1970. Id.
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tween 1975 and 1979. 2 ' Today health care consumers choose mid-
wifery with increasing frequenc.y. Because midwives, rather than
physicians, usually assist home births" and the number of births
attended by midwives increased, the number of nonhospital births
correspondingly increased during the 1970s. 2"
The historic trend away from home births derives mainly from
the argument that a hospital birth is a safer birth. 2' The evidence
to support this argument, however, is inconclusive. 25 Some studies
indicate that the perinatal mortality rate is six times greater for
hospital births as compared to home births. 2" The results Of these
studies conflict with the results of other studies which the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AGOG) has used to
show that home births are four times more dangerous than hospital
births." In April, 1985, the World Health Organization recognized.
the ambiguity of available studies and recommended joint surveys
between countries to evaluate childbirth methodologies: 28 Thus, the
safety issues of home birth are far from clearcut and much research
still is needed.
Perhaps because the safety of home births is unclear, the fifty
states and the District of Columbia correspondingly have never
treated or regulated midwifery uniformly. A midwife may he either
a nurse-midwife or a lay midwife. Nurse-midwives are trained and
regulated as nurses. 29 States usually require separate certification or
licensure for nurses to practice as nurse-midwives, 30 and generally
provide standards and regulations for nurse-midwives which are in
addition to those required of nurses. 3 ' Nurse-midwives most usually
assist births in an institutional setting," but may assist home births."
2 ' Id, at 17. In 1979, midwives attended 1.6 percent of all births in the United States. Id.
This represents a 77.8 percent increase in midwife attended births over the 1975 figure.
22 See .supra note 3 and accompanying text.
'" STATisTics, .tupta note 17, at 4. Since . 1970, home births have risen to one percent or
all births in 1979. Id.
21 Lander, supra note 1, at 231.
25 Id.
2 n 1 Id
27 hi.
2H Appropriate Technology fur Birth, 1985 L./ow:KT 436
29 It. DEVRIES, REGULATING BIRTH, MIDWIVES, MEDICINE & THE LAW 17 {1985).
1 ' See DI:VRIES, REGULATING, supra note 29, at 17.
" 1 See id.
See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
' See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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Lay midwives may be licensed nursess 4 or non-nurse lay peo-
ple." They may receive fairly extensive formal training and edu-
cation or, alternatively, be completely self-educated." Lay midwives
usually practice professionally and charge for their services." They
almost exclusively assist home births."
Regulation of nurse-midwives and lay midwives varies from
state to state. All fifty states and the District of Columbia permit the
practice of nurse-midwifery." Twenty-three states expressly ap-
prove the practice of lay midwifery." Of the states which regulate
" See, e.g., Leggett v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 612 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980);
Leigh v, Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 506 N.E.2d 91 (1987) (Leigh If).
" LITOFF, MIDWIFE DEBATE, supra note 7, at 14- 15; n v..—...; —E . RIES, REGULATING, ST,Iptit note
29, at 17.
11 1d.
17 See id.
11 See LITOFT, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 143-44.
N See ALA. CODE §§ 34-19-2-34-19-10 (1985); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.68.010-08.68.410
(1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336-752.2 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-86-501-17-86-507
(1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. Conc.§§ 2746-2746.8 (West Supp. 1988); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-
36-106(1)(f) (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-86a-20-102a (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 122(3)(h) (1974 & Supp. 986); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3306.1-3306.8 (Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 464.001-464.023 (West 1981 & Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-26-1-43-
26-39 (1984); Haw. REV. STAT. § 321-13 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 54-1401-54-1416 (1979 &
Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 111, para. 3401-3437 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1987);
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5 (Burns 1982 & Supp. 1987); Iowa CODE ANN. §§ 152.1-152.10
(West 1972 & Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-1113-65-1134 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 314.011-314.991 (Michie/Cobbs-Merrill 1983 & Supp. 1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 37:911-37:931 (West 1974 & Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 2101-2258
(1978 & Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 7.601-7-603 (1986); Mass. GEN. L.
ch. 112, §§ 74-81C (1986); 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 182 (Law. Co-op.); Mien. STAT.
ANN. § 14.15(17210) (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. §§ 148.171-148.285 (1980); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 73-15-1-73-15-37 (1972 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 335 (Vernon 1966 &
Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-8-101-37-8-444 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1738-
71-1765 (1986); NEV. REV, STAT. ANN. § 632 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV, STAT.
ANN. § 326-B (1984 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:10 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.7-6, 24.1-3(R), 24-1-21, 61-6-16 (1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2560
(McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 90-178.1-90-178.7 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12,1
(1978 & Supp. 1987); Oino REV. Cone ANN. §§ 4731.30, 4731.32, 4731,33 (Baldwin 1984 &
Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 577.1-577.6 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 678 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 171-176 (Purdon 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-13-9-
23-13-10 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-33 (Law. Co-bp. 1986 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 36-9A (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-101-63-7-209 (1986); TEX. REV. Ctv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4513-4528c. (Vernon 1976 & Supp.1988); UTAH Comm; ANN. § 58-44 (1986
& Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1571-1584 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-274
(1982 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.88 (1978 & Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE
§§ 30-15-1-30-15-8 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 441.15 (West 1988); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-
21-101-33-2 1-156 (Michie 1987). See generally Mullinax, Supplemental Report on Nurse-Midwifery
Legislation, 32 J. OF NURSE-MIDWIFERY 156-180, 222-253 (1987).
4 " See ALA. CODE § 34-19-3(b) (1985); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.05.056-18.05.070 (1986); A itiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-751-36-757 (1965 & Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-85-101-17-
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the practice of nurse-midwifery, two states explicitly restrict a nurse-
midwife's attendance at home births,'"
The regulatory schemes of Wisconsin, Tennessee, Massachu-
setts, and Texas exemplify the inconsistent regulation of midwifery
in the United States. Wisconsin; Tennessee, and Massachusetts reg-
ulate nurse-midwifery but do not prohibit or regulate lay midwi-
fery. 42 Wisconsin explicitly prohibits nurse-midwives from attending
home births.43 While Tennessee does not prohibit nurse-midwives
from attending home births by statute," Tennessee case law indi-
cates that nurse-midwives may not attend home births. 45 Massachu-
setts amended its nurse-midwifery statute in 1987 to allow the at-
tendance of nurse-midwives at home births.46
In contrast to Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massachusetts, Texas
comprehensively regulates both nurse-midwifery and lay midwi-
fery. 47 Furthermore, Texas allows nurse-midwives and lay midwives
to attend home :births." Thus, Wisconsin, Tennessee, Massachu-
setts, and Texas approach the regulation of midwifery very differ-
ently.
Restricting the attendance, of nurse-midwives at home births
while at the same time allowing the attendance of lay midwives
creates potentially three classifications: the nurse-midwife, who may
85-108 (1987 & Supp, 1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2505-2515 (West Supp. 1988);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 467 (West Supp. 1987);' GA. CODE ANN. § 31-26 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch . 111, para. 4411-3 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1277
(West Supp. 1987); Mimi. STAT. ANN. § . 14,15(17001) n.24 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT.
§§ 148.30-148.32 (1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-25-35 (1972 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 334.190, 334.260 (Vernon 1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 326-D (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:10 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-3(R), 61-6-16(C) (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. '§ 90478.1-90-178.7 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13-9 (1956); S.C. Com: ANN.
§ 40-33-50(7) (Law. Co-op.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204 (1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-145-32.1-147 (1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 18.50 (1978 & Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.10(5) (West 1988). See
generally Mullinax, Supplemental Report on Nurse-Midwifery Legislation, 32 J. OF NURSE-MIDWI-
FERY 156-180, 222-253 (1987),
41 ALA. CODE § 34-19.8 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 441.15(2)(b) (West 1988). Lay midwives
primarily assist home births.
See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, §§ 74-81C (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-101-63-7-209
(1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 441.15 (West 1988). See generally Mullinax, Supplemental Report on
Nurse-Midwifery Legislation, 32 J. OF NURSE-MIDWIFERY 156-180, 222-253 (1987).
"See WIS, STAT. ANN. § 441.15(2)(b) (West 1988).
" See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-101-63-7-209 (1986).
45 See Leggett v, Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 612 S•W.2d 476, 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
46 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 182 (Law. Co-op.).
47 TEX. REV. CIV, SLAT. ANN. art. 4513-4528c. (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988); Tax. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 45121 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
4' Id.
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not attend home births; the lay midwife, who may attend home
births; and the nurse functioning as a lay midwife, whose legal
ability to attend home births may be unclear. Under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, a classification discriminating between lay midwives
who are nurses and lay midwives who are not nurses must be
reasonably related to a permissible state purpose. 49
In Massachusetts, a midwife unsuccessfully claimed that sus-
pending her nursing license because she practiced lay midwifery
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 5° the midwife, Leigh,
argued that applying nurse-midwifery regulations to a nurse prac-
ticing as a lay midwife created two classifications of lay midwives:
lay midwives who are not nurses and lay midwives who are nurses.''
Leigh took the position that discriminating between these two clas-
sifications of lay midwives did not further a legitimate state inter-
est. 52
 The court did not address the two classifications of lay mid-
wives but instead addressed the distinctions between lay midwives
and nurse-midwives. The court held that suspension of Leigh's
nursing license for the practice of lay midwifery was permissible
constitutionally. 53 Thus, while midwifery regulations may create
classifications of midwives, the only court addressing this issue con-
cluded that such classifications do not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
.	 This note analyzes the classification of lay midwives into nurses
and non-nurses under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 1 will exam-
ine midwifery as a profession, first placing present-day midwifery
in its historical context, 54 then exploring the relative safety and
efficacy of various childbirth choices. 55 Section II will examine how
state legislatures address regulation of midwifery, focusing in par-
ticular on regulation in Wisconsin, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and
See Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 560, 506 N.E.2d 91, 93
(1987) (Leigh II); U.S. CONS-r. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNs .r. amend. XIV, § 1.
5" Id.
Brief for Appellant at 30, Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558,
506 N.E.2d 91 (1987) (No. 4173). •
"Id. at '28-40.
" Leigh 11, 399 Mass. at 560, 506 N.E.2d at 93.
54 See infra notes 71-146 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147-73 and accompanying text.
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Texas. 5" This section then will present the standard of review that
the United States Supreme Court has applied to laws regulating
professions under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment." Finally, this section will introduce the cases from
Tennessee and Massachusetts in which nursing boards suspended
a nurse's license because the nurse practiced lay midwifery.`'"
Although finding that the Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massa-
chusetts regulatory schemes pass constitutional scrutiny,• Section
111 will argue that these statutes are not the best way to protect the
health and safety of citizens in these states." This section will pres-
ent the Texas regulatory scheme for midwifery as a model for other
states in regulating midwifery."' This note will advocate that, al-
though classifications made between lay midwives who are nurses
and those lay midwives who are not nurses probably pass constitu-
tional muster, state legislatures could better protect the well-being
of mothers and infants first by regulating lay midwilery," 2 second
by allowing a nurse the choice to function as a lay midwife instead
of a nurse-midwife," 8 and third by permitting nurse-midwives to
attend home births."
I. MIDWIFERY
To place the present regulation of midwives in the United
States in context, this section will examine the historical trends" in
childbirth and the relative safety of childbirth choices.° Midwives
traditionally attended the majority of births."' As physicians entered
the area of childbirth promising greater safety," the number of
midwives correspondingly decreased."" Medical research, however,
does not strongly support the assumption that physicians are invar-
56 See infra notes 174-221 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 222-49 and accompanying text.
5"See infra notes 250-289 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 309-28 and accompanying text.
"" See infra notes 329-37 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 338 and accompanying text.
"' See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 330-333 and accompanying text.
See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
65 See infra notes 71-146 and accompanying text.
6"See infra notes 147-173 and accompanying text.
67 See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
"8 See infra notes 97-99,118-22 and accompanying text.
1"' See infra notes 100-103,109-12,123-26 and accompanying text.
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iably the safest birth attendants or that home births are unquestion-
ably unsafe. 7°
A. History of Childbirth Attendants
Midwifery, historically a female profession, has progressed
from a group of unorganized, untrained, and unregulated birth
attendants'' to a group of organized, generally trained, and increas-
ingly regulated birth attendants. 72
 In the United States, midwives
attended the majority of births until early in this century." Between
1910 and 1975, the number of births attended by midwives de-
creased to less than one percent of all births. 74 In the 1950s, mid-
wives organized and sought recognition as trained, professional
" See infra notes 147-173 and accompanying text.
71
 See generally J. TOWLER & J. BRAMALL, MIDWIVES IN HISTORY AND SOCIETY (1986). The
midwives of the eleventh century period were most likely illiterate and uneducated with some
possessing practical knowledge and skills while others were probably both ignorant and
unproficient. Id. at 22.
Midwives of this period clearly were tried as witches. T. FORBES, THE MIDWIFE AND THE
WITCH 117 (1966). Witch hunting, trials and buntings were commonplace. Poor people and
women had no influence or power in this Church-dominated society. Some sought witchcraft
possibly as a source of potential power. The use of witchcraft by the poor peasants, especially
women peasants, presented a threat to the influence of the Church. 'FOWLER, supra, at 34.
Witchcraft related to many of the superstitions surrounding birth. Additionally, witches
needed the by-products of birth and fetal parts for ceremonial purposes. FORBES, supra, at
118. The fat of unbaptized infants formed the base for the "ointment of witches" used to
induce an altered state of mind during witchcraft ceremonies. Id. at 119.
Many of the charges were untrue and prosecutors often obtained "confessions" under
duress. Id. at 115. Alongside the admitted and organized witches were community women
practicing herbal medicine — the midwives, wise women and healers. While their motives
were credible, the Church classified them as witches. Eventually these women were distin-
guished From organized witches as "whitewitch[esr or "blessing witch[es]." TOWLER, supra,
at 34-35.
During the fifteenth, sixteenth and part of the seventeenth centuries, midwifery was on
the whole a lowly profession. FORBES, supra, at 112. In France, the fees paid midwives were
so incredibly small that they left midwives economically worse off than other peasants. In
Bavaria, a midwife's social standing was so inferior that she was scorned by even the lowest
male occupation. Her son might be barred from a trade guild because of her profession. Id.
at 112-13.
Although medicine was beginning to be based on scientific knowledge, midwifery had
no such scientific basis. Because of the lack of teachers and education, midwives received
limited formal instruction leaving them frequently ignorant and superstitious. Id. at 112.
Midwives generally had no detailed knowledge of a mother's pregnancy prior to the actual
delivery. They used no equipment. Most importantly, they lacked even the most basic theo-
retical knowledge of anatomy and physiology because of their exclusion from education.
TOWLER, supra, at 44.
72
 DEVRIES, REGULATING, supra note 29, at 17-18.
73
 LITOFF, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 17.
74 STATISTICS, supra note 17, at 17.
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birth attendants. 75 Since 1950, legislatures have enacted regulatory
schemes for nurse-midwives and, to a lesser degree, lay midwives. 7"
Thus, midwives gradually have organized and achieved recognition.
The history of midwifery demonstrates that although assisting
in childbirth was exclusively a female domain for centuries, 77 male
physicians have attempted to replace midwives as the primary birth
attendants. 78 Men entered the field of childbirth during the six-
LrroFF, MinwIFE DEBATE, supra note 7, at 12-13.
7" Id. at 16-17.
77 DONEGAN, Supra note 11, at 9.
78 See "FOWLER, supra note 71, at 12. Around 500 B.C., Greek midwives were an honored
group of practitioners and given social recognition. At the time of Hippocrates and Socrates,
midwives were divided into two classes. Midwives possessing superior skill and experience
assisted with abnormal and/or difficult. labors. Less experienced midwives attended normal
births. Additionally, male and female physicians were available if needed. Id.
By 300 B.C., midwives had experienced a drastic change in their social status. Id, at 13.
The change in the status of midwives was associated with changes in attitudes to women as
healers and midwives. In Athens, women were prohibited from practicing midwifery. Id.
During this period, the greek midwife Agnodike was tried for practicing midwifery
under "false pretenses." Agnodike disguised herself as a man and studied midwifery under
a male physician. She ,then practiced midwifery disguised as a male but revealed her true
sex to her patients. Agnodike's services were in great demand amongst the women of Athens.
Needless to say, this adversely affected the livelihood of male physicians who denounced her
and brought charges for illegal practice of midwifery. The women of Athens appealed for
clemency for Agnodike. The lawyers repealed the Athenian Law prohibiting women from
practicing midwifery and provided that "three of the sex should practice this art in Athens."
Id, at 13-14.
During the thirteenth century, men studied medicine at secular universities. Id. at 29,
50. Male physicians became an elitist group as a result of the monetary cost and time involved
in receiving the required university training. DoNEGAN, supra note 11, at 14. Society excluded
women from universities in England and higher education generally was unavailable to
women in other parts of Europe, TOWLER, supra note 71, at 29. Because society denied
women the necessary education and training to practice medicine, the medical profession
also excluded then] from participating in the formalizing and organization of medicine. Id.
at 28-29.
In addition to physicians, practitioners were organizing two other professional groups
within medicine, surgeons and apothecaries. Surgeons were less prestigious than physicians
and were organized into Barber-Surgeon's Guilds during the thirteenth century. Id. Very
few women were admitted to these guilds. Barbers were a class of surgeons who were
tradesmen skilled with instruments and performed minor surgery. Their role in childbirth
was to remove the baby (usually dead) with instruments. Because barbers possessed the
exclusive rights to use instruments, midwives were barred from using instruments at a birth
and were forced to call a barber-surgeon if instruments became necessary. Surgeons received
more extensive training and performed major surgery. Id.
As a result of their exclusion from educational facilities, the profession of medicine
evolved actually to disqualify women, the very individuals who had previously been the
unofficial practitioners of daily medicine. Id. at 20. Interestingly, early male physicians showed
no interest in women's conditions or midwifery. As a result, women continued to attend
childbirth. Id,
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teenth century. 79
 The interest in childbirth on the part of male
physicians began the process resulting in compulsory training and
regulation of midwives. 8° Physicians in Germany, Holland, Switzer-
land, and France encouraged municipal authorities to organize and
to regulate the practice of midwifery. 8 '
Both the Church and the State first regulated midwifery in
England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." In the
middle sixteenth century the episcopacy started to license mid-
wives." Under their requirements, first a midwife had to show that
she was professionally competent 84 and.had received proper instruc-
tion in baptism. 85 Next licensed midwives and surgeons examined
the midwife regarding her character and ski11. 8" Lastly, the regula-
tion required the midwife to take an oath which specified that she
would not practice witchcraft. 87 Midwives practicing without a li-
7" 'FOWLER, supra note 71, at 43.
•
"" id. Ultimately, this process also led to the role conflict between physicians ansl, mid w ives
that still exists today. Id. The new learning available to men widened the gap between
physician and midwife and reinforced male supremacy in the medical arena. Id. at 45. See
generally W. ARNEY, POWER AND THE PROFESSION OF OBSTETRICS 20-50 (1982).
"' Id. at 50.
"2 FORBES, supra note 71, at 139-43. Regulation of midwifery began somewhat earlier,in
Germany and France. The first municipal ordinances are thought to be those in the Hcb.ans,.
mettordnung of Regensburg, Germany, dating from 1452. Id. at 131-32. The first German
ecclesiastical regulations seem to be the Wiirzburg Synodal Statutes of 1491. These Gerrnart
regulations in part dealt with midwifery training, service of rich and poor, arid when thq
midwife should seek medical assistance. Id. Also evident was concern that midwives might
engage in witchcraft or superstitious methods. Id. French regulations similarly recognized
the need for close supervision of the midwife, mandated that they receive professional and
religious instruction, and required that they take an oath. Id.
"Id. at 143. In 1512, under Henry VIII, Parliament passed an act which allowed the
Church to issue licenses for the practice of medicine and surgery. Licensing of qualified
midwives probably began shortly thereafter. Id.
84 Id. at 144; DONEGAN, supra note 11, at 11. During the seventeenth century, as is the
case now, most births were uncomplicated. Childbirth was not yet believed to be inherently
dangerous or traumatic. Midwives were to permit birth to occur with little or no interference.
Id. at 10. Testimonials indicate that midwives gained experience by practicing midwifery
unlicensed for years, It is doubtful that they were always, or even often, supervised. Id. at
13.
MS FORBES, supra note 7 1 , at 144. The Church was very concerned that midwives be able
to baptize infants who might not survive until a priest could be summoned. DONEGAN, supra
1101C 11, at I I.
Foativs, supra note 71, at 144. English regulations were most concerned initially with
the character of the midwife as opposed to her obstetrical skill. Id. at 139. The ideal quali-
fications of the midwife were that she be a "paragon of virtue, a source of comfort and
support to the woman in labor." DONEGAN, supra note 11, at
° DONEGAN, supra note 11, at 11-12; FORBES, supra note 71, at 144.
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cense, or violating rules of professional conduct, could be charged
and brought to trial before an ecclesiastical court. 88
During the eighteenth century, British medicine progressed
significantly." Physicians entered the field of childbirth promising
greater safety for women and their infants." Although the Royal
College of Physicians officially recognized midwifery as a form of
medical practice for its members,'" it did not regulate midwives. 92
Physicians replaced midwives in increasing numbers, replacing mid-
wives almost completely by the early nineteenth century."
Similar to their British counterparts of the seventeenth century,
midwives played a major role in childbirth in colonial America.'"
While most midwives held a respected position in early America,
some continued to be prosecuted as witches. 95 Midwives were subject
to very little regulation, as were other medical professionals. Society
viewed birth as a normal process requiring little human interven-
tion."
Although midwives initially held a respected position in Amer-
ican society, male physicians started replacing midwives as birth
attendants during the eighteenth century." By the end of the eigh-
teenth century, the United States had four male-only medical
schools. The scientific education the schools made available to
males interested in obstetrics gave thein a tremendous advantage
over female midwives. Midwives experienced increasing difficulty
remaining up to date with obstetrical advances. 98 Throughout this
period, midwives and their SVP06;rters unsuccessfully attempted to
restore obstetrics to the rrii'dwiires. 99
-• •
!4" n (;RBES, supra note 71, at 149.
"" DONEGAN, supra note I 1, at 4. From this point on, this history will focus on only the
evolution of British and American midwives.
Id. at 13.
"2 Id. Additionally, the two other organized groups of medical practitioners did not
regulate midWivcs. Id. Sec supra note 78 for a discussion of organized groups of medical
professionals.
"" DONEGAN, Stipra note I I, at. 4.
14 Lrrovy, MinwivEs 1860, supra note 17, at 4.
95 Id. at 4-5. In 1638 magistrates of New England prohibited Jane Hawkins, a midwife,
from practicing medicine alter site delivered a stillborn infant and was accused of witchcraft.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 9.
4" Id.
"DONEGAN, supra note 1I, at 5.
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By the 1860s, male obstetricians had replaced midwives almost
completely in their attendance on upper-class and middle-class
women for childbirth.'" in 1868, physicians founded the American
Journal of Obstetrics as the first specialized medical journal in the
United States.'°' They established the American Gynecological So-
ciety and the American Association of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists in 1876 and 1888, respectively.' 02
 Physicians urged that only
physicians were qualified to engage in obstetrics, a complex medical
specialty. The medical profession viewed childbirth as an abnormal
condition, which it necessarily had to control with drugs, instru-
ments, and surgery.'°3
Regulation of physicians as health care professionals in the
United States began in the nineteenth century and improved the
credibility of physicians as childbirth attendants.'" The American
Medical Association (AMA) actively pursued licensure of physicians
at the state level shortly following its inception in 1847.'" Licensure
of physicians established the legal precedent for licensure of health
care professionals and provided a political model to achieve licen-
sure.'" The implications for other health care professionals reached
further than providing a political model for licensure, however.
The timely licensure of physicians gave physicians unique and ex-
clusive status among health care professionals.'° 7
 Other health care
professionals found it necessary either to avoid areas of practice
already reserved to physicians or to prepare for tremendous op-
position if they infringed on these areas.'"
" Id. at 4.
LITOFF, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 20-21. Physicians generally ignored mid-
wives during the late nineteenth century and assumed that physicians eventually would
replace midwives entirely.
1 °2 Id.
'° Id,
104 See Id, at 18-21.
1 °3
 Bullough, The Current Phase In The Development of Nurse Practice Acts, 28 Sr. Louts
U.L.J. 365 (1984). The American Medical Association felt that licensure would help it achieve
its objectives of I) raising the level of physician competence, 2) raising educational standards,
3) decreasing competition from other types of practitioners, and 4) increasing the status and
power of physicians. The AMA organized state and local medical societies to pursue licensure.
In 1873, Texas passed the first major -act requiring state examinations and registration for
physicians. Id.
"}6 Id. at 366.
107
 Id. The authors and revisors of physician registration acts assumed that physicians
were the only health care professionals. Id.
" Id. Until the early 1970s, nursing professionals avoided areas of practice already
reserved to physicians. Id. Since 1971, the nursing profession has been expanding into areas
of practice which were once exclusively part of the physician's domain. Id.
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Despite the increased prestige of physicians resulting from li-
censure, midwives continued to deliver approximately .fifty percent
of all infants during the First decade of the twentieth century.'" 9
While physicians attended most upper-class and middle-class deliv-
eries, midwives attended the majority of rural deliveries and deliv-
eries of poorer women."" Women chose midwives, in part, because
midwives' fees were one-third to one-half those of physicians, and
midwives provided nursing and housekeeper services after the de-
livery." Additionally, women avoided hospital births because of
their cost and because society, in general, viewed hospitals as dis-
ease-ridden places for death."' Consequently, the vast majority of
all births took place in the home.
At the turn of the century very few states regulated midwifery
and satisfactory training programs virtually did not exist.' Al-
though a few American schools provided satisfactory training pro-
grams,'only a. very small number of midwives received training
at such schools."" Thus, with the exception of some-midwives who
received excellent training,"" the majority of midwives lacked for-
mal training and were ignorant of modern obstetrical techniques." 7
By 1910, physicians, health officials, and legislators no longer
ignored midwifery but, in contrast, hotly debated the role midwives
should play in healthcare." 8
 Physicians were concerned with the
overabundance of medical practitioners and with medical education
reform. Many physicians believed that eliminating midwifery would
decrease competition for physicians." 9 Additionally, around 1910,
health officials became aware of the excessively high maternal and
1" LITOFF, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 27. Immigrant women and Southern black
women indicated a definite preference for midwives, Id.
'") See DONEGAN, .supra note 11, at 4.
" 1 1.„rrotT, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 28. Physicians clearly did not perform these
services. Id.
112 id ,
115 hl. at 29, 32. A few schools for midwives did exist but the quality of the instruction
these schools offered is highly questionable, Id. at 32-33.
114
 Id. at 34-35.
115 Id. at 41.
"" Id. at 33-34. A number of European immigrants were midwives who had been trained
at European schools. Mormon midwives generally were well trained, Id.
117 Id. at 41.
11 N Id.
id. at 48. Physicians were concerned that the increasing number of physicians would
decrease both their status and their incomes. Physicians used state regulation to help limit
their own numbers. Physicians also limited the number of medical schools and graduates.
The American Medical Association began to police the quality of medical schools in 1906
and pursue medical education reform. Id, at 48-50.
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infant mortality rates in the United .St4tcs.,,Physicians and health
officials questioned the influence midwives had on these statistics.' 29
The "midwifery problem" received co,nsiderable debate.' 2 ' States
addressed midwifery by actively regulating midwives or by com-
pletely outlawing midwifery.' 22
As a result of pressure from physicians and new legislation, by
1930 midwives attended only fiftegn:percent of all births. 123 Several
factors contributed to the decrease,,M the number of midwives in
the United States. First, physiciarn;strongly urged that only physi-
cian intervention would lower childbirth death rates.' 24 Second, the
superior organization and political power that opponents of mid-
wifery possessed allowed them to influence state legislatures to ap-
propriate inadequate funds for training and regulation of mid-
wives, 12' and to enact state regulation which decreased the number
of midwives eligible to practice midwifery. 126
During the midwife debate of the early twentieth century, some
physicians and health officials endorsed the idea of a trained and
regulated nurse-midwife as an answer to the "midwife problem." 27
The nurse-midwife is a licensed nurse with additional training in
obstetrics.' 28 During the 1920s and 1930s, midWiferV supporters
established schools for nurse-midwifery and employed their grad-
uates. SUpporterS of midwifery gradually continued to form addi-
tional programs.' 2"
In 1955, nurse-midwives took charge of their profession by
forming the American College of Nurse-Midwives (ACNM) in order
to evaluate nurse-Midwifery edikation programs and achieve legal
' 2" Id. at 50-51. In 1917, the United States Children's Bureau reported that childbirth
was responsible for more deaths among women of childbearing age than any disease except
tuberculosis. Of the fifteen countries studied, only two had maternal mortality rates higher
than the United StateS. Id. at 53.
" I Id. at 137.
122 Id. at 137-39.
123 1d. at 139.
121 Id.
125 Id. at 140.
' 2"Id. at 141. Lastly, social and cultitral changes tended to support hospital births and
the use of obstetricians. The number of hospital beds available for maternity use increased.
The automobile allowed easy transportation to the hospital. A significant drop in the birth
rate caused an increasing number of people to view birth as a special event requiring a
physician's skill. Id. at 141-42.
127 Id. at 142.
' 2 11 Id,
"Id. A nurse-midwife is a registered nurse with an additional one to two years of
obstetrical training. l)EVRIEs, REGULATING, supra note 29, at 17.
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recognition of the nurse-midwife.''° In the last two decades, the
status of the nurse-midwife has improved significantly."' In 19.71,
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists formally
recognized the nurse-midwife as part of the obstetric team: 132
During the 1970s, interest in lay midwifery experienced a re-
vival. Organizations, critical of the automatic and impersonal ap-
proach to childbirth practiced in many American hospitals, pro-
moted family-centered obstetrical care and home birth.'"
Individuals interested in home birth turned to lay midwives to be
their birth attendants.'"
Unlike midwives at the turn of the century, the majority of
today's lay midwives are both educated and organized.'" They
primarily assist home births.'" Present-day lay midwives may be
licensed nurses or non-nurse lay people.'" They may receive fairly
extensive formal training and education or, alternatively, they may
be completely self-educated.'"
The American Ccillege of Nurse-Midwives (ACNM) is aware of
the home birth movement in the United States but encourages
institutional births.'" In 1973, the Executive Board adopted a po-
Lrroii., MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 142. The public, however, continues to
confuse th'e nurse-midwife with the lay midwife of the past. Id.
Id. Nurse-midwives employed as nurse-midwives in the United States increased four-
teen percent between 1968 and 1971. /d.
•	 .
133 1d. at 142-43. Regardless of these great strides, die development and recognition of
nurse•inidwivcs has been slowed by the factors which , helped to diminish the importance of
midwifery in the early twentieth century. Id. at 143.
1 " Id. These organizations included the,AssOciatiiin for Childbirth at Home (ACAH),
Home Oriented Maternity Experience (HOME1,, Honebirth, Inc., and the National Associ-
ation of Parents and Professionals for Safe Alternatives in Childbirth (NAPSAC). While these
biginriinitions gladly receive the support of medical Professionals, these groups
also argue that professionals trained to deliver infants in the hospital are not always the best
libme birth attendants. Id.
.,.„
1 " LITOFE, MIDWIFE DELVV,I;E, Silpyil note 7, at 14.
LI'l'OPF, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 145-46. It is difficult to determine how
many lay midwives practice in the United States. Id. at 145. In some states lay midwives
practice illegally 'and; therefore, not openly. Id.
Bilef for Appellant at '29, Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558,
506 N;E:2d 91 (1987) (No: 4173).
LITOFO, MILIWIFEDEBÂTE, supra note 7, at 14-15. Litoff divides midwives into three
classes: 1) "Old-style" midwives, 2) Certified nurse-midwives, and 3) "a new brand of younger,
empirically trained women variously referred to as 'lay,' 'uncertified,' or 'independent' mid-
wives." Id.
Nurse-midwives and lay midwives formed the Midwives' Alliance of North America.
This organization does not feel that a nursing license most always be a prerequisite for the
practice of midwifery. Id. at 18.
I" See id. at 17.
1 " LITOFE, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 144-45.
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sition statement encouraging hospital or birth center deliveries."°
The ACNM's position follows from a goal to promote the profes-
sional, regulated status of the nurse-midwife among both physicians
and the general public."' A study done by ACNM in 1985 identified
the two most influential factors in the success of nurse-midwifery
practice: suitable collaboration with physicians, and philosophical
agreement between the collaborating nurse-midwives and physi-
cians regarding childbirth and practice. 142 Because the vast majority
of physicians oppose home births and physician support is necessary
for a successful nurse-midwifery practice, an official position by the
ACNM encouraging hospital or birth center deliveries is a political
necessity. ' 43
A split exists, however, among ACNM's members on the issue
of home births.'" Not all nurse-midwives support ACNM's encour-
agement of institutional deliveries."5 Some nurse-midwives, in ad-
dition to lay midwives, deliver children at home in response to
consumer demands for home birth. 146 Thus, while ACNM officially
encourages institutional deliveries, a number of its members pro-
vide assistance at home births.
Despite ACNM's position encouraging institutional deliveries,
states nonetheless may need to regulate midwifery because women
continue to choose midwives as birth attendants for home births.
While midwives as professionals have progressed from the un-
trained, ignorant birth attendants of medieval times to the generally
skilled, 'trained and organized midwives of today, regulation of
midwifery would provide a framewbrk for the evaluation of mid-
wives as birth attendants, and would assure their expertise. To
regulate midwifery rationally, state legislatures must first consider
how best to protect the health and safety of women who wish to
choose home births, and their infants.
B. Relative Safety of Childbirth Choices
The historic trend away from home births finds its basis in the
argument that a hospital birth is a safer birth for both mother and
140 Id.
"'See generally Rooks, The Context of Nurse-Midwifery in the 1980s, 28 J. OF NURSE-MID.
W1FERY 3 (Sept./Oct. 1983).
142 Haas and Rooks, National Survey of Factors Contributing To And Hindering The Successful
Practice of Nurse-Midwifery, 31 J. OF NURSE-MIDWIFERY 212, 214 (1986).
" 5 See Rooks, The Context of Nurse-Midwifery in the 1980s, 28 J. or NURSE-MIDWIFERY
(Sept./Oct. 1983).
144 L1TOFF, Minwolv..s 1860, supra note 17, at 144-45.
145 1d.
14111d.
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baby."' The safety issues surrounding home birth and midwives,
however, are unclear.'" While the majority of births occur sponta-
neously, without intervention, the process of birth is a complicated
physiological event." 9 A number of physical and psychological fac-
tors can alter the progress of a labor tremendously.'" Thus contro-
versy surrounds the relative safety of childbirth choices.
Proponents of home birth argue that the home is not only
psychologically beneficial, but also the safest place to give birth.'''
They urge that the iatrogenic' 52 risks of a hospital birth are greater
than the risks associated with the limited availability of emergency
services at a home birth.'• 3 Home birth supporters note that a
hospital birth usually involves aggressive, if not invasive, interven-
tion during labor and delivery. They argue that this is inappropriate
for the low-risk birth.' 54
Increased stress, anxiety, and sometimes fear, home birth sup-
porters note, are associated with a hospital birth. This alone may
increase morbidity and mortality for both mother and baby.'"
Moreover, home birth supporters criticize as misleading studies
indicating tremendous risks for home births. They state that these
statistics include inherently high-risk, unplanned births and
planned births which take place without a trained midwife."
Proponents of home birth generally also support midwives as
home birth attendants.' 57 They point out that reduction of the
numbers of midwives attending births has not solved the problem
of high infant mortality in the United States.'•• Many European
countries which use lay midwives and nurse-midwives as material
providers of maternity care have significantly lower infant mortality
rates.'''`'
10 '/,under, supra note 1, at 231.
1411 Id
' 1 " Id. at 230.
[sold.
15 ' Rantz, supra note 2, at 43.
latrogenic risks are those risks inadvertently caused by medical intervention. For
example, surgery lo correct a dangerous condition necessarily causes a risk of infection.
13" Hoff, supra note. 2, at 21.
na Id,
15r, Id.
15" Id. at 20. The ACOG has used these studies to show a two to fivefold increase in the
risk of' perinatal mortality for out-of-hospital births. Id.
' 57 LITOPV, M WWIFE DEBATE, supra note 7, at 14.
Iffrovr, Miowtvcs 1860, supra note 17, at 147. The infant mortality rate in the United
States declined from 124 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1910 to 18.5 in 1972. ld.
I" Id. In 1972 a number of countries reported infant mortality rates below those of the
United States, Sweden (10.8 deaths per 1000 births), the Netherlands (11.7 deaths per 1000
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Opponents of home birth dispute the contention that home
births attended by midwives are as safe or safer than hospital births
attended by obstetricians. They argue that it is infinitely more risky,
to both mother and baby, to give birth at home.'" They state that
all births should should occur in the hospital because hospital births
are safer. In support of their argument, they cite research which
indicates that twenty to thirty percent of newborn complications
occur in low-risk births. 16 '
The ACOG criticizes home birth studies for their methodol-
ogy. 162 These criticisms include the small numbers of deliveries in
births), Norway (11.8 deaths per 1000 births), Denmark (12.2 per 1000 births), and England
and Wales (17.2 per 1000 births). Id. While the maternal mortality rate has declined more
successfully, European countries again have lower maternal mortality rates. Id.
Litoff notes three major distinctions between the health care programs of these European
countries and that of the United States. First, each of these countries have government-
sponsored medical insurance programs in contrast to that of the United States which is
largely privately funded. Second, European physicians intervene less and practice more
conservative obstetrics than American physicians. Last, midwives and nurse-midwives are an
integral part of European maternity care. Id. at 147-48.
' 6" Hoff, supra note 2, at 19.
The primary risk to the mother is massive, life-threatening hemorrhage, either
during labor or after the birth due to failure of the uterus to contract or to
retain placental fragments. The risks to the fetus include fetal distress and
neonatal lack of oxygen due to poor blood supply to the placenta, separation
and hemorrhage of the placenta, or umbilical cord accidents. A doctor who was
treating the mother in a hospital would rapidly replace blood and fluid and, in
some cases, perform an emergency hysterectomy to save her life. The baby
would immediately be delivered by caesarean section or forceps. Were these
complications to occur at home, the mother or the fetus could die. Death to the
fetus from lack of oxygen can occur within live minutes from the time that fetal
distress first becomes apparent.
In certain high-risk women (for whom home birth is not advisable) the
majority of complications in labor and delivery can be predicted. Nevertheless
20 to 30 percent of problems with newborns occur in the low-risk population.
Indeed, complications that occur during labor are better predictors of fetal
morbidity and mortality than are high-risk factors identified earlier in the
pregnancy.
M. (footnotes omitted).
16 ' Id.
162 Id. at 20.	 •
To estimate the risk of home birth in terms of perinatal mortality, one
would have to compute perinatal mortality rates fur all complications that might
occur even under maximal hospital supervision ("unpreventable deaths") and
subtract that from the perinatal mortality rates that occur in home births ("pre-
ventable deaths" plus "unpreventable deaths"). These data are unavailable. Most
studies compare temporal trends of the perinatal mortality rates in specific areas
with changes in the home birth rate, or differences in the perinatal mortality
rates in countries that report varying proportions of home births. Such com-
parisons are of little value because of numerous confounding variables.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the studies, the short duration of the studies, the absence of a
control group, and lack of randomization of subjects.'" The AGOG
states that these defects in study methodology necessarily lead to
flawed results.'"
The only recent controlled retrospective study comparing
home births and hospital births concluded that the additional med-
ical and obstetrical procedures done in a hospital did not clearly
improve the health and safety of mother and baby over the home
birth.'"5 The study compared 1,046 home births with 1,046 hospital
births. Mothers were matched for age, parity, risk factors, and other
measures. 1 "6 The study found that although the hospital births were
accompanied by significantly greater invasive procedures,' 67 no dif-
ference existed in perinatal mortality rates between the two
groups. 10"
Therefore, legislatures, healthcare professionals, and consum-
ers lack conclusive data about the relative risks of home versus
hospital birth, lay midwife versus nurse-midwife, and midwife ver-
sus obstetrician. Experts do not agree on a single choice as being
the most effective or the best For all situations. Because of the
scarcity of well designed, controlled studies comparing childbirth
methodologies, additional studies are needed.' 69 Until additional,
well-designed studies are completed, no conclusive answer on the
relative safety of home births versus hospital births is available.
Despite the lack of clearcut data on childbirth methodologies,
states have a legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety
of women and infants.' 7" The state may fulfill its obligation to
protect its citizens' health and safety in the area of childbirth by
regulating health care professionals, including midwives, and by
assuring that they practice within their state defined roles."' The
163 Id.
1111 Id.
'"' Id. "If therefbre seemed appropriate to conclude that for low medical risk women
home delivery is an alternative that cannot be dismissed as contraindicated because of an
unacceptable high risk to maternal or infant health." Id. (quoting L.E. Mehl, Research on
Alternatives in Childbirth, What Can It Tell Us About Hospital Practice?, 2 'IVES:TY-FIRST CENTURY
OBsTEriocs Now 171-207 (1977)).
1-1off,wpra note 2, at 20.
1 " 7 Id. Invasive procedures including caesarean sections, forceps, episiotomies. Id.
1511 Id.
169 Id. at 25.
"7" See Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 560-61, 506 N.E.2d
91, 93 (1987).
' 7 ' See Leigh II, 399 Mass. at 561, 506 N.E.2d at 93,
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state also legitimately may choose to encourage hospital births until
medical research clearly decides the safety issues of home birth and
hospital birth."' The state has a legitimate interest in protecting
the health and safety of its citizens and therefore may establish
reasonable regulations for childbirth and childbirth attendants.'"
Controversy, however, surrounds the relative safety of various child-
birth choices. Thus, how a state should best protect the health and
safety of its citizens in the area of childbirth is unclear.
II. REGULATION OF MIDWIVES IN THE UNITED STATES
State legislatures have . addressed safety concerns regarding
home birth and birth attendants in various ways. All fifty states and
the District of Columbia regulate nurse-midwifery." 4 In great con-
trast, only twenty-three states regulate the practice of midwifery by
lay midwives.'" Some states make lay midwifery illegal."G Other
states do not make the practice of lay midwifery illegal but also do
not regulate it."' Thus, the status of lay midwives as professionals
differs tremendously from state to state.
While all fifty states and the District of Columbia regulate
nurse-midwifery, only twenty-one states and the District of Colum-
bia specifically name nurse-midwives in the authorizing statute.'"
"2 See id.
1 " See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
174 See supra note 39.
'" See supra note 40.
"6 LITOFF, Mit:mire DEBATE, supra note 7, at 17. The legal status of lay midwives in the
various jurisdictions is far from clear. For example, Florida adopted a Midwifery Practice
Act in 1982 which modernized prior existing law. In. 1984, however, the Florida legislature
amended this statute to provide that no new students could study in the midwifery schools
established by the 1982 Act. Id.
"7 See, e.g., Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Tennessee, as discussed infra notes 184-221
and accompanying text.
'" See ALA. ConE § 34-19-2 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-752.A.2 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-86-501-17-86-507 (1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. Cone §§ 2746-2746.8 (West
Supp. 1988); Cow. REV. STAT. § 12.36-106(1)(f) (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-86a-20:
86e (Supp. 1987); D.C. Cone ANN. § 2-3306.2 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.012 (West
1981 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REV.. STAT, ANN. §.314.011 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983 & Supp.
1986); Mn. HEALTH OCC. ConE ANN. §§ 7-601-7-603 (1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, $$ 80C-
80D (1986); 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv, 182 (Law. Co-op.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(17210)
(Callaghan 1980); MoNT. CODE ANN. 37-8-409 et seq. (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1738-
71-1765 (1986); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2560 (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 90-
178.1-90-178.7 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4731.30, 4731.32, 4731.33 (Baldwin 1984
& Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit, 59, §§ 577.1-577.6 (West Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 36-9A (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-44-1-58-44-11 (1986 & Supp. 1987); W.
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Twenty-two states name nurse-midwives only in the regulations.' 79
Nine states do not specifically name nurse-midwives in either the
authorizing statute or the regulations.'E1 "
VA. CODE §§ 30-15-1-30-15-8 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 441.15 (West 19118). See generally
Mullinax, supra note 42, at 156-180, 222-253.
"" See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 156-180, 222-253. The following states name
nurse-midwives only in their regulations: Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. at 157.
1 K" See generally id. at 156-1140, 222-253, The following slates do not name nurse-mid-
wives in either their statutes or regulations: Alaska, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. See id. at 157.
Regulatory schemes also vary as to the authority charged with regulating nurse-midwifery
practice. In thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, the Board of Nursing regulates
nurse-midwifery practice, regardless of whether or not the statute specifically names nurse-
midwives. See ALASKA STAT. § 08.68.100 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-752.A.2 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 17-86.503 (1987); CAL. Bus. & Puor. Com; § 2746 (West Supp. 1988);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-3306.4 (Stipp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 464.003(c) (West 1981 & Supp.
1987); GA. Conti ANN, § 43-26-4 (1984); loam) CODE § 54-1404 (1979 & Supp. 1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. Ell, 111,  para. 3407 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 152.1-
152.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987); RAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-1113-65-1134 (1985); Kv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 314.042 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983 & Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT, ANN.
§ 37:918 (West 1974 & Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 2101-2258 (1978 &
Supp. 1986); Mu. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 7-201, 7-205, 7-602 (1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
112, § 80C (1986); 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 182 (Law. Co-op.); Mien. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.15(17210) (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. §§ 148.171-148.285 (1980); MISS. Cone ANN.
§ 73-15-17 (1972 & Supp. 1987); MO. ANN. STAT. § 335.036 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1988);
MONT. Cone ANN. §§ 37-8-102, 37-8-409 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1738-71-1765 (1986);
Nev, REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.120 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, § 326-
ES:4 (1984 & Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. Cone § 43-12.1-08 (1978 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 577 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 678 (1987); S.C. Cone ANN. § 43-33
(Law, Co-op. 1986 & Stipp. 1987); THNN. CODE ANN. § 63-7-207 (1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4513-4525 (Vernon 1976 & Supp.1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1571-1584
(Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.88.080 (1978 & Supp. 1987); W. VA. Cone § 30-
15-1 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN, § 441.15 (West 1988); WYO. STAT, ANN. § 33-21-122 (Michie
1987). See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 156-180, 222-253.
The Board of Nursing and the Board of Medicine jointly regulate nurse-midwifery
practice in four states. See ALA. COME § 34-19-10 (1985); NEB. Rev. STAT. §§ 71.1743, 71-
1755 (1986); S.D. CODIFEEn LAWS ANN. § 36-9A (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-274 (1982 &
Stipp. 1987). See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 156-180, 222-253.
The Board of Medicine regulates nurse-midwifery practice in four states. See IND. CODE
ANN. § 25-22.5-2-7 (Burns 1982 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:10.2 (West 1978 &
Stipp. 1987); OHIO REV. Cone ANN. §§ 4731.30, 4731.32, 4731,33 (Baldwin 1984 & Stipp.
1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 171 (Purdon 1968). See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at
156-180, 222-253.
The Department of' Public Health regulates nurse-midwifery practice in six states. See
CONN. GEN, STAT. § 20-86c (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 122(3)(h) (1974 & Supp.
1986); HAW, REV. STAT. § 321-13 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-16.c (1978); N.V. PUB.
HEALTH Law § 2560 (McKinney 1985); R.I. GEN, LAWS §§ 23-13-9, 23-13.10 (1956). See
generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 156-180, 222-253.
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Jurisdictions also differ in the authority given to nurse-mid-
wives. Sixteen states and the District of Columbia grant prescriptive
authority to nurse-midwives."" Three states do not allow nurse-
midwives to attend home births.' 82 Thus, the fifty states and the
District of Columbia regulate nurse-midwives but these regulations
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
As with nurse-midwifery, the regulatory schemes affecting lay
midwifery differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Twenty-three
states do not prohibit the practice of lay midwifery.I 83 Two jurisdic-
tions, while prohibiting nurse-midwives from attending home
births, do not regulate or prohibit lay midwifery.'" State legislatures
may need to address the regulation of lay midwifery to protect the
safety of women and infants effectively.
A. Present Regulation of Midwives in Wisconsin, Tennessee,
Massachusetts and Texas
Twenty-three state legislatures recognize lay midwifery.' 88 The
majority of states, however, do not regulate lay midwifery.' 86
 As
examples, this section will present the regulatory schemes of Wis-
The Committee of Certified Nurse-Midwifery regulates nurse-midwifery practice in two
states. See N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 90-178.4-90-178.7 (1985); UTAn CODE ANN. §§ 58-44-4, 58-44-
8 (1986 & Supp. 1987). See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 156-180, 222-253.
In one state, Colorado, nurse-midwifery is regulated by a number of agencies. See Cow,
REV. STAT. 12-36-106 (1985). See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 156-180, 222-253.
13 ' ALASKA ADMIN. ConE tit. 12, § 44.010 et seg. (April 1988); ARIZ. REV, STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1921 (1956); D.C. Coi: ANN. § 2-3306.6(6)(7) (Supp. 1987); Idaho (Bd. of Nursing,
"Nurse Practitioners, Minimum Standards, Rules and Regulations," di. 3, ch. 4, §§ 3-4007-
3.4009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2805-21 (1978); Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(17076)
(Callaghan 1980 & Supp. 1987); Mississippi (Standards of Practice for Nurse-Midwifery in
the State of Miss., § 11(B)); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639.1375 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 326-B:10(II) (1984); New Mexico (HED-80-6, 301-303); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18.2(b)
(1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 678.375, 678.385, 678.390 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-
9A-13 (1986); TENN, CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-123, 63-7-207 (1986); Utah; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 2022(7) (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.64.0118 (Supp.1987). 'See generally
Mullinax, supra note 42, at 158.
132
 Leggett v. Tennessee lid. of Nursing, 612 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980);
ALA. CODE 34-19.8 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 451.15(1)(6) (West 1988). While Tennessee
statutes and regulations do not prohibit nurse-midwives from attending home births, Ten-
nessee case law indicates that nurse-midwives may not attend home births. See supra notes
44-45.
"5 See supra note 40.
"4 Leggett, 612 S.W.2d at 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 451.15 (West
1988).
"5 See supra note 40.
1 "6 See Lauri:, MIDWIFE DEBATE, supra note 7, at 17. See generally Mullinax, supra note
42, at 160.
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consin and Tennessee, two jurisdictions that prohibit nurse-mid-
wives from attending home births but do not regulate lay midwives,
Massachusetts, a jurisdiction that now allows nurse-midwives to at-
tend home. births but does not regulate lay midwives, and Texas, a
jurisdiction that regulates both nurse-midwifery and lay midwifery.
• Wisconsin regulates nurse-midwives but does not regulate lay
midwives." Nurse-midwives practice under a section of the Board
of Nursing statute.'" The Wisconsin Board of Nursing statute pro-
hibits nurse-midwives from attending births outside a licensed fa-
cility.'" Therefore, nurse-midwives may not attend home births
legally.'""
In contrast to its treatment of nurse-midwives, Wisconsin does
not regulate lay midwives.'•" Lay midwives are free to legally attend
home births because they are unregulated.'" 2 Thus, both nurse-
midwives and lay midwives practice legally in Wisconsin, but only
unregulated lay midwives may attend home births.
Similarly to Wisconsin, Tennessee regulates the practice of
nurse-midwifery, but does not regulate the practice of lay midwi-
fery.'" Nurse-midwives practice under the general parameters of
the Nursing Statute.'" 4 The Tennessee Nursing Statute allows gen-
erally for expanded roles of nurses.'" Only the regulations of the
Board of Nursing specifically name nurse-midwives.'" While the
regulations of the Board of Nursing do not explicitly preclude
nurse-midwives from attending home births,'" 7 Tennessee case law
indicates that nurse-midwives may not attend home births.'"
1 " Wis. STAT. ANN. § 441.15 (West 1988). See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 25 1 .
I " Wis. STAT. ANN. § 441,15 (West 1988). In 1980, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a
separate section of the Board of Nursing statute to regulate nurse-midwifery. The Wisconsin
Board of Nursing regulates n u rse -midwives. Id.
Ns Id,
1411 Id.
191 Mullinax, supra note 42, at 251. The Wisconsin Medical Practice Act only regulates
midwives certified before May 7, 1953. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.10(5) (West 1988).
' 92 Lay midwives are not illegal but are unregulated; therefore, their practice can consist
of attending home births.
' 93 Nurse-midwives practice under regulations promulgated pursuant to TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 63-7-101-63-7-209 (1986). The practice of lay midwifery is excluded from the
practice of medicine by TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204(a) (1986). See Leggett v. Tennessee Bd.
of Nursing, 612 S.W.2d 476,480. See generally Mullinax, supra note 42, at 243-244.
PJ , TENN. CODE AsiN. §§ 63-7-101-63-7,209 (1986).
" 5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-7-123 (1986) (providing for expanded role as nurse practi-
tioner); Mullinax, supra note 42 at 243.
196 Mullinax, supra note 42, at 157, 243. Nurse-midwives may obtain prescriptive authority
separately if they meet the Board of Nursing's qualifications for prescriptive authority. Id. at
159, 243.
1417 TENN. COMP. R. & REDS. tit, 63, ch. 1000-4 (1986).
193 Leggett v. Tennessee Bd. of' Nursing, 612 S.W.2d 476, 48 1.
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Because the Medical Practice Act specifically excludes midwi-
fery, the practice of lay midwifery is not illegal in Tennessee.' Lay
midwifery, however, is also not regulated. 2°° Lay midwives, conse-
quently, freely attend home births. 2" Thus, in Tennessee, as in
Wisconsin, regulated nurse-midwives are prohibited from attending
home births while lay midwives, completely unregulated, assist
home births.
As in , Wisconsin and Tennessee, in Massachusetts the practice
of nurse-midwifery and lay midwifery is lega1. 202 Unlike Wisconsin
and Tennessee, however, both nurse-midwives and lay midwives
may assist home births. 203 Nurse-midwives practice midwifery in
Massachusetts under portions of the 1977 Nurse Practice Act. 204
The Board of Nursing regulates nurse-midwives in Massachu-
setts. 2"5 The Massachusetts legislature amended the Nurse Practice
Act in _June 1987 to allow nurse-midwives to assist home births. 206
While Massachusetts regulates nurse-midwives, it does not regulate
lay midwives207 and does not prohibit them from attending home
births.218 Thus, both Massachusetts' nurse-midwives and lay mid-
wives legally may attend home births.
199 Id.; TENN. CODE ANN. 63-6-204 (1986); Mullinax, supra note 42, at 243.
200 Mullinax, supra note 42, at 243.
201 Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 560, 506 N.E.2d 91, 93
(1987). MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, §§ 80C, 80D (1986).
202 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 182 (Law. Co-op.). Lay midwives are not illegal in
Massachusetts; therefore their practice can consist of attending home births.
203 Mass. GEN. L. ch. 112, §§ 80C, 80D (1986).
2"4
	
GEN. L. ch. 112, § 80C (1986); Mullinax, supra note 42, at 157. Neither the
Massachusetts Nurse Practice Act nor the Board of Nursing's regulations give nurse-midwives
prescriptive authority. Mullinax, supra note 42, at 158. Prior to June 1987, Massachusetts
followed a statutory approach similar to that of Wisconsin and Tennessee. See supra notes
192-93 and accompanying text. The Massachusetts Nurse Practice Act implicitly prohibited
nurse-midwives from attending home births. See Mass. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 80C (1986).
SOS 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 182 (Law. Co-op.).
206 Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 560, 506 N.E.2d 91, 93
(1987). The 1901 Medical Practice Act of Massachusetts specified obstetrics as an area of
medical practice reserved exclusively to physicians. LITOFF, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at
56. This is in contrast to the majority of states enacting similar legislation. The Massachusetts
Medical Practice Act does not distinguish midwifery from medical practice. Id.
Failing to distinguish midwifery from medical practice left the legality of lay midwifery
in doubt until the Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing decision of 1985 (Leigh 1), which
held that midwifery was not the practice of medicine. 395 Mass. 670, 680, 481 N.E.2d 1397,
1353 (1985).
2" Because lay midwives in Massachusetts are unregulated, they may practice in any way
they desire.
2°8 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 45I3-4528c. (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988); Tex. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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Unlike Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massachusetts, Texas regu-
lates both nurse-midwives and lay midWives. 2" Both nurse-midwives
and lay midwives legally attend home births in Texas. 21 " Nurse-
midwives practice under the Nurse Practice Act.2 " Lay midwives
practice under a lay midwifery practice act. 2 t 2
Nurse-midwives practice as Advanced Nurse Practitioners in
Texas. The Texas legislature amended the Nurse Practice Act in
1981 to clarify the Board of Nursing's jurisdiction to regulate Ad-
vanced Nurse Practitioners. 2 " The regulations pursuant to this
amendment specify the qualifications for and the requirements to
practice as a nurse-midwife in this state. 214 Texas does not prohibit
nurse-midwives from attending home births. 215
While the Board of Nursing regulates nurse-midwives, the
Texas Department of Health regulates lay midwives pursuant to a
1983 lay midwifery practice act."' The Texas lay midwifery act
provides standards for education and training of lay midwives, 217
w, Id.
21 " TEX. REV. Cm STAT. ANN. art, 4513-4528c. (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988).
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
2 " TEX. REV. CIV. STAVr. ANN. art. 4513-4528c. (Vernon 1976 & Supp.1988); Mullinax,
supra note 42, at 245.
2 "Aullinax, .supra note 42, at 245. While nurse-midwives do not have independent
prescriptive privileges, the Texas Medical Practice Act provides for physicians delegating this
privilege to nurse-midwives. Tut. Civ.• STAT. ANN, art. 4495B § 1.02 (Vernon Supp.
1988).
2 " See 'PIA. REv. Ctv, STAT. ANN. art. 4513-4528c. (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988).
1 ' 5 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
a' T•x. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
TRAINING COURSE	 •
See. 10. (a) An approved lay midwifery training course may be offered by a
local health department, an :tccredited postsecondary educational institution, or
an adult education program ....
ExAmINATION
Sec. 11. (a) A person who has completed an approved lay midwifery training
course or who has comparable training approved by the lay midwifery board is
entitled to take the final examinatilm of the training course.
Id,
Tyx. REV, CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
IDENTIFICATION REttutRESIENT
Sec. 13. (a) In December of each year, a person who practices lay midwifery
shall identify himself as a lay midwife by appearing in person before the county
clerk of the county in which the person resides or before the county clerk of
each county in which the person practices lay midwifery and delivering to the
county clerk a verified identification form „
ROSTER
Sec. i 5. (a) The department shall maintain a roster of all persons identified to
practice lay midwifery.
Id.
502	 BOSTON COI LEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:477
and sets forth a procedure for registration of lay midwives. 218
 The
statute specifies consumer disclosure requirements for lay mid-
wives. 21 • It lists several procedures that the lay midwife may and
may not perform. 22° This Act lastly provides for a study of the
practice of lay midwifery in Texas. 22 ' The Texas Department of
218 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
DUTIES OF LAY MIDWIVES; DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
Sec. 16. (a) Each lay midwife shall disclose in oral and written form to a
prospective client the limitations of the skills and practices of a lay midwife.
(b) The department with the advice of the lay midwifery board shall pre-
scribe the form of the written disclosure required by this section, which shall
include the information that a lay midwife:
(1) may assist only in normal childbirth;
(2) has or does not have an arrangement with a local physician for referring
patients who have complications that occur before or during childbirth;
(3) may not administer a prescription drug without a physician's supervi-
sion, perform a Caesarean section, or perform an episiotomy; and
(4) has or has not passed the lay midwife training course final examination
approved by the board,
Id.
"" TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988).
DUTIES OF LAY MIDWIVES; DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
Sec. 16....
(e) A lay midwife shall encourage a client to seek prenatal care.
(f) A lay midwife shall encourage a client to seek medical care if the lay
midwife recognizes a sign or symptom of a complication to the client's childbirth.
(g) Each lay midwife shall disclose to a prospective or actual client the
procedure for reporting complaints with the department.
PROHIBITED ACTS
Sec. 17. A lay midwife may not:
(1) administer a prescription drug to a client except under the supervision
of a licensed physician in accordance with the laws of this state;
(2) use forceps or surgical instruments for any procedure other than cutting
the umbilical cord or providing emergency first aid during delivery;
(3) remove placenta by invasive techniques;
(4) advance or retard labor or delivery by using medicines or mechanical
devices;
(5) use in connection with his name a title, abbreviation or any designation
tending to imply that he is a "registered" or "certified" lay midwife as opposed
to one who has identified himself in compliance with this Act; or
(6) assist at childbirth other than a normal childbirth except in an emer-
gency situation that poses an immediate threat to the life of the mother or
newborn.
Id.
220TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512i (Vernon Supp. 1988). "Sec. 23. REPORT. The
department shall study the practice of lay midwifery in the state, including the quality of the
services provided by lay midwives and the efficacy of the training program, disclosure
requirements, and prohibitions established in this Act." Id.
22 ' See, e.g., Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 560-61, 506
N.E.2d 91, 93 (1987) (equal protection challenge was in addition to other grounds).
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Public Health, therefore, regulates lay midwifery pursuant to a very
specific lay midwifery practice act.
Thus, while Texas regulates lay midwives, Wisconsin, Tennes-
see, and Massachusetts have attempted to protect the health and
safety of their citizens only through the regulation of nurse-mid-
wifery. Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massachusetts have failed to ad-
dress the regulation of lay midwifery. In addition, Wisconsin and
Tennessee prohibit nurse-midwives from attending home births. In
contrast, the Texas legislature has enacted statutes to regulate both
nurse-midwives and lay midwives. To protect the health and safety
of their citizens adequately, states may need to regulate the practice
of lay midwifery as well as nurse-midwifery. Any regulations a state
imposes must pass constitutional scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
B. Equal Protection — Standards of Review
Midwives prosecuted under statutes that differentiate between
lay midwives and nurse-midwives attack the statutes on the grounds
that such a classification violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 222 The equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment prohibits states from treating similarly situated
persons or classes differently. 22" In order to strike down midwifery
statutes as violative of equal protection, a court must find that
statutory classifications distinguishing between nurse-midwives and
lay midwives do not reasonably further a legitimate state interest. 224
The United States Supreme Court applies a "mere rationality"
test225 in evaluating classifications that do not involve a suspect
222 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1437-38 (1988).
22"
	
discussion of Leigh II, 399 Mass. at 560-61, 506 N.E.2d at 93, infra notes 285-89
and accompanying text where court upheld classifications between nurse-midwives and lay
midwives because the court found that these classifications rationally furthering a legitimate
stale purpose.
224 In Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court set forth the
mere rationality test: "[T]he classification must be reasonable; not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall he treated alike." 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920).
225
	
Court has accorded suspect classifications a higher level of scrutiny. It subjects
classifications based on race or national origin to "strict scrutiny." These classifications must
utilize the least restrictive alternative to further a compelling state interest. Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S 214, 216 (1944) reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945); United States v,
Carolene Prods. Co„ 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n,4 (1938). The court gives gender based classi-
fications and classifications discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy a slightly lower level of
scrutiny. The classification must accomplish an important governmental objective with a
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class226
 or infringe on a fundamental right, 227 and has been reluctant
to apply a higher level of scrutiny to social and economic regula-
tion. 228
 The Court does-not strike down statutes merely because the
classifications are imperfect. The practical problems of government
may justify some inequality if any reasonable basis supports 4.229 If
the legislature has a legitimate interest in imposing the challenged
economic or social regulation, the statute must merely be rationally
related to the law's objective. The law will violate equal protection
only if the challenged classification is purely arbitrary.2" In general,
the United States Supreme Court's stance has been one of legislative
deference. 231
The equal protection clause guarantees that people who are
similarly situated will not be treated dissimilarly without justifica-
tion. 232
 The Court determines whether persons are similarly or
dissimilarly situated in relation to the purpose of the challenged
means substantially related to that objective. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69 (1981);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-90 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76
(1971).
W The United States Supreme Court has applied the "strict scrutiny" test if a classifi-
cation significantly burdens the exercise of a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (marriage and family life); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630
(1969) (interstate travel); Harp& v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 618 (1966) (voting).
227 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U,S. 471 (1970); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1986).
225 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classification made by its laws are imper-
fect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." "The problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific." "A statutory discrim-
ination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it."
Id. (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has exercised extreme judicial
restraint, aside from cases involving suspect classifications and fundamental rights, in eval-
uating most statutory challenges based on equal protection. TRIBE, supra note 223, at 1439-
43.
225 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 70 (1911).
2" McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). The Court will invalidate
classifications "only if no grounds. can be conceived to justify them." Id.
251 TRIBE, supra note 223, at 1437-38.
2" See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469-71 (1981). The
court found that the statutory purpose in this case was to discourage illegitimate teenage
pregnancies by making men criminally liable for intercourse with women under eighteen.
According to the Court, the legislature possibly could have reasoned that men are differently
situated from women because men are not deterred by becoming pregnant. Id.
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statute)'" While the legislature's purpose must be legitimate, courts
give great deference to the legislature's ability to evaluate its objec-
tives. The Court looks to "conceivable" objectives which might have
motivated the legislature. 2"4
 If the objective is not grossly unfair or
totally irrational, the Court usually accepts it. A merely ill-advised
legislative objective is not illegitimate. 235
The Court has determined legislative purpose by looking to a
statutory statement of purpose or the legislative history of the chal-
lenged statute. If the legislative history of the statute clearly states
a legislative purpose, the Court uses this "actual" legislative purpose
whether or not this purpose actually motivated the statutory enact-
ment.236
 If the Court cannot derive an "actual" legislative purpose,
it has on occasion validated a statute by using a hypothetical legis-
lative purpose. 237
 In other cases, the Court has declined to hypoth-
esize. 238
 Thus, the Court's requirements for a legitimate purpose
vary from case to case. 239
Once the Court determines a legitimate state purpose, it then
examines whether the means the legislature has chosen, and the
classifications used, rationally relate to this purpose."' The Court,
in the past, struck" clown statutes or regulations which employ irra-
233 See supra note 231.
23 ' See Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 3311 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
235 See United States R.R. Retirement 	 v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1980). Author-
ities dispute the validity of this approach. The argument for requiring "actual" purpose is to
apply "indirect pressure on the legislature to state its own reasons for selecting the particular
means and classifications" resulting in fuller debate for each legislative action. Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 47 (1972).
The argument against requiring "actual" purpose is that it "leaves the judiciary free to
strike legislation it finds politically objectionable by attributing to the legislature either an
illegitimate purpose or a purpose that, though legitimate, is too far removed front the means
selected to withstand even minimum scrutiny." The Supreme Court 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L.
Rev. 93, 160 (1981).
235 See McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (any conceivable basis).
07 E.g., McGinnis v, Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973).
238
 Occasionally the Court will strike down a statute because the purpose is illegitimate.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 878, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985)
(promoting the business of domestic insurers by penalizing foreign insurers is not a legitimate
state purpose); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (possible
desire to exclude "hippi communes" from the federal food stamp program is not a legitimate
state purpose).
238 See TRIBE, supra note 223, at 1440.
210
 In Morey v. Doud, the Court determined the legitimate purpose was "to protect the
public when dealing with currency exchanges." 354 U.S. 457, 464"(1957). Discriminating in
favor of a specific company, however, was not rationally related to that purpose. Id. at 466,
The Court subsequently overruled this analysis in City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S.
297, 306 (1976).
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tional, arbitrary methods, or classifications, to further a permissible
objective."' In the majority of cases, however, the Court has not
invalidated statutes or regulations provided the classifications might
rationally relate to a legitimate state purpose. 242
Because the chosen classification might rationally relate to a
legitimate state purpose, the Court is reluctant to invalidate a statute
because its means are under-inclusive or its means do not burden
or benefit all persons who are similarly situated. 243 The Court rea-
sons that "[i]t is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of
the same genus be eradicated or none at all." 244
 Thus, the Court
will not strike down a statute merely because the legislature failed
to address all factors related to its legitimate purpose. 245
The most common statutory classifications are under-inclusive
with regards to some classes, but over-inclusive 246 for other
classes. 247 In other words they do not burden all persons similarly
situated, but they burden some persons who are not similarly situ-
ated. Invalidation of these statutes depends on the Court's charac-
terization of the statute and the degree of threatened or actual
harm. 248
Because of the Court's deference to the legislature, invalidation
of social or economic statutes on equal protection grounds occurs
241 See TRIBE, supra note 223, at 1442-43.
242 See id. at 1446-49.
243
 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). Denying under-
inclusive statutes meaningful review, however, may encourage legislatures to discriminate
against political minorities which will result in dissimilar treatment for persons similarly
situated. See Tunic, supra note 223, at 1447-48.
244
 If the Court strikes down under-inclusive statutes, states may avoid attacking a prob-
lem at all if their resources are inadequate. Political factions may never agree to attack all
the various aspects of a particular problem. Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1085 (1969). See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 348 (1949).
24s
	 Court is more willing to strike down statutes which are over-inclusive or which
extend burdens or benefits to more than those persons who are similarly situated. Over-
inclusive laws which burden some persons who should not have been burdened appeal to
the Court's sense of fairness. Developments, supra note 245, at 1086.
24fi Tussman, supra note 245, at 352.
247
	 supra note 228, at 528.
2414 Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 560-61, 506 N.E.2d 91,
93 (1987). See also, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-62, 470, reh'g
denied, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981) (Ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers bears a rational
relation to the state's theoretical objectives.); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (Mandatory retirement age rationally furthered state's purpose of
"assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police."). If a statute's rationality is debat-
able, the Court upholds a somewhat attenuated connection between purpose and method.
'TRIBE, supra note 223, at 1445-46.
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only in a small minority of cases. Midwifery statutes are social stat-
utes regulating professions permitted to exist by the state. If in
enacting a statute regulating midwifery, a legislature has a legitimate
state purpose, and if the classification rationally furthers this pur-
pose, a court would uphold the statute:24" Thus, midwifery statutes
are unconstitutional only if the means selected by the statute are
not reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.
C. State Court Treatment of Midwifery
Tennessee and Massachusetts courts have addressed challenges
to midwifery regulations under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment:25" These cases raise several issues regarding
the legal ability of a nurse to practice midwifery. The midwifery
regulatory scheme may preclude only nurses, and no other single
group, from practicing midwifery as lay midwives.251 A regulatory
scheme also may preclude a nurse from functioning as a lay midwife
only under some circumstances. 252 If the regulatory scheme pre-
cludes only nurses from practicing lay midwifery and does not
reasonably further a legitimate state interest, it may violate the equal
protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. 253
Tennessee courts have addressed the issue of whether a nurse
can choose to practice as a lay midwife as opposed to a nurse-
midwife. In Leggett v. Tennessee Board of Nursing, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals held that the Board of Nursing could not disci-
pline a nurse who practiced as a lay midwife independent of her
role as a nurse. 254 The court reasoned that the Board of Nursing
249
	
11, 399 Mass. at 560-61, 506 N.E.2d at 93; Leggett v. Tennessee lid. of Nursing,
612 S.W,2d 476, 480 (1980) (dictum).
While Texas courts have not addressed midwifery regulations in an equal protection
context, they have addressed the relationship between the practice of midwifery and the
practice of medicine. 13anti v, State, 163 Tex. Grim. 89, 92-93, 289 S.W.2d 244, 247 (1956).
Prior to the enactment of midwifery statutes, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
midwifery was not the unlicensed practice of medicine. Id. The court reasoned that childbirth
was a normal physiological event, not a disease. Id. at 92, 289 S.W.2d at '247. It noted that
the legislature failed to include maternity care within its definition of the practice of medicine.
Id. at 92-93, 289 S.W.2d at '247. Therefore, the Barth court, in its discretion, concluded that
midwifery was not the practice of medicine.
Wisconsin courts have not addressed the regulatory issues of midwifery.
25" See Leigh 11, 399 Mass. at 560-61, 506 N.E.2d at 93.
251 See Leggett, 612 S.W.2d at 481 (A nurse functioning as a lay midwife may not use his
or her nursing license to perform functions a lay person could not perform.).
252 See id. at 480 (dictum).
255 Leigh II, 399 Mass. at 560-61, 506 N.E.2d at 93; Leggett, 612 S.W.2d at 481.
254 612 S.W.2d 476, 481 (1980).
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lacked jurisdiction over lay midwives and that nurse-midwifery reg-
ulations do not apply to lay midwives or nurses practicing as lay
midwives. 255
In Leggett, Elizabeth Leggett, a licensed registered nurse, deliv-
ered approximately fifty babies as a lay midwife.256 She was neither
certified as a nurse midwife nor qualified to be certified. 257 She did
not hold herself out as a nurse to her clients. 258 The Board of
Nursing revoked Leggett's license because she attended births with-
out being certified as a nurse-midwife and Leggett brought an
appeal. 259
The court held that the Board of Nursing does not have juris-
diction over a nurse when she provides services as a lay midwife
independently of her status as a nurse. 26° The court reasoned that
the authorizing legislation did not give jurisdiction over lay mid-
wifery to the Board of Nursing. 26 ' The court additionally refused
to apply nursing regulations to Leggett in her practice as a lay
midwife.262 Lastly, the court noted that the Board of Nursing failed
to show that Leggett's practice as a lay midwife adversely affected
her skill or ability to practice as a registered nurse. The court
analogized revocation of a nurse's license, under these facts, to a
revocation for "serving occasionally as a secretary or receptionist." 268
The court indicated, in dicta, that imposing nursing regulations
on a nurse practicing midwifery independent of his or her status
as a nurse would impose a burden on nurses which was not imposed
upon other similarly situated lay midwives. 264 The court doubted
that this discriminatory classification could pass constitutional scru-
tiny. 265 The court also indicated that such an application of nursing
regulations would not be reasonably related to promoting the legit-
imate state purpose of ensuring public health because it would allow
255 Id. at 479-80.
256 Id. at 478.
257 Id. at 477.
256 Id. at 480. While Leggett did not tell her clients she was a nurse, she did dispense a
medication to them that was not available to laypersons without a perscription. Id. at 473,
481.
259 Id. at 477.
260 Id. at 481.
26 ' Id. at 479-80. The court noted that 1) the legislature specifically excludes midwifery
from the practice of medicine and 2) the Nurse Practice Act does not deal with midwifery
or include it within the definition of professional nursing. Id.
262 /d. at 480.
265 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id,
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anyone, except regulated nurses, to attend home births.'" Thus,
the court in Leggett indicated that preventing a nurse from practic-
ing midwifery outside her role as a nurse does not rationally further
a legitimate state purpose and is not constitutional. 267
Unlike the Tennessee court which addressed the issue in dicta,
a Massachusetts court directly addressed the issue of whether re-
voking a nurse's license for the practice of lay midwifery violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 268
 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that revoking a
nurse's license for the practice of lay midwifery does not violate the
equal protection clause. 269
 Janet Leigh, a nurse practicing lay mid-
wifery in Massachusetts, unsuccessfully challenged the revocation
of her nursing license on equal protection grounds. 2" In Leigh I,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that the
practice of lay midwifery was not prohibited by statute in Massa-
chusetts. 271
 The court reasoned that ordinary assistance in child-
birth, midwifery, is not the practice of medicine.272
26" Id. at 481.
No one questions that in an emergency a mother and infant arc better off
in a hospital with a certified nurse-midwife or a physician. But given that some
couples will continue to decide on home deliveries, the Board's decision over-
looks the fact that Certified nurse-midwives cannot participate in home deliv-
eries.
The Board's decision if' allowed to stand would mean that anyone except
licensed nurses could act as midwives. This is contrary to the goal of promoting
public health.
Id. (quoting Chancellor's opinion below).
2"7
 The only other reported Tennessee case dealing with midwifery is Nurse Midwifery
Assoc, v. Ilibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). In this case a nurse-midwife
challenged her denial of malpractice insurance on antitrust grounds. This note does not
address this issue.
2"" Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 560-61, 506 N.E.2c1 91,
93 (1987). Previously, in its 1907 decision, Commonwealth v. Porn, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the 1901 Medical Practice Act reserving
obstetrics to physicians as an area of medical practice. 196 Mass. 326, 82 N.E. 31 (1907). In
Porn, a midwife was tried and convicted in the Superior Court for illegally practicing medi-
cine. Id. The court noted that while Porn did not hold herself out as a medical practitioner,
the Medical Practice Act defined the practice df medicine to include obstetrics, the practice
of midwifery. Id. at 327-28, 82 N.E.2d at 31. In common usage, midwifery meant obstetrics.
Id. The court indicated that the legislature was able to separate the practice of midwifery
from the practice of medicine but had chosen not to do so. Id. at 328, 82 N.E. at 32. Thus,
in Massachusetts during this time, a midwife could not legally practice her profession. See
LITOFF, MIDWIVES 1860, supra note 17, at 56.
%'"" Leigh II, 399 Mass. at 560-61, 506 N.E.2d at 93.
270 See infra notes 271-89 and accompanying text.
27 ' 395 Mass. 670, 670, 481 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (1985).
2" Id. at 677-80, 481 N.E.2d at 1353. The court factually distinguished the midwife in
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The court reviewed the Board of Registration in Nursing's
action suspending Janet Leigh's license to practice as a registered
nurse. 278
 The Board found that she was attending women at home
births in violation of the Nurse Practice Act. 274
 The Board deter-
mined that Leigh informed clients of her status as a registered nurse
with obstetrical training. 275
The Board stated that Leigh was in violation of the Nurse
Practice Act on two counts. First, she was not certified or authorized
to practice as a nurse-midwife. Second, even if she were a nurse-
midwife, both a statute and regulations prohibit nurse-midwives
from attending women at home births. 276 The Board concluded
that Leigh was a registered nurse engaged in the unauthorized
practice of midwifery and suspended her nursing license for one
year. 277
 Leigh sought review of the Board's decision. 278
The court held that the Board had the power to discipline
Leigh only on the basis that she violated the Nurse Practice Act and
the regulations promulgated thereunder. The court noted, how-
ever, that the Board had no power to discipline Leigh for the mere
practice of midwifery. 27 " The court stated that "[t]he Legislature
has not regulated midwifery by persons other than nurses.'' 280
 The
court remanded to the Board for further determinations on
whether Leigh had violated the Nurse Practice Act. 28 '
On remand, the Board again suspended Leigh's license to prac-
tice as a registered nurse on the basis that she violated the Nurse
Practice Act and its associated regulations. 282 Leigh again appealed
Porn as having been convicted for the unauthorized practice of medicine because she had
used obstetrical instruments and prescriptions in caring for her patients. The court inter-
preted midwifery to mean "ordinary assistance in the normal cases of childbirth" and confined
the holding of Porn to its facts. Id.
"S Id. at 672, 481 N.E.2d at 1349. Leigh was seeking review of the Board's decision for
a second time. Id.
274 Id.at 673, 481 N.E.2d at 1349.
22" Id. Additionally, Leigh used obstetrical instruments during some births. Id.
276 Id. Leigh argued that she was practicing lay midwifery which is outside the practice
of nursing. Id. at 678, 481 N.E.2d at 1351.
277
	 at 674-75, 481 N.E.2d at 1350. The Board argued that midwifery practiced outside
of nursing or obstetrics (i.e. lay midwifery) was illegal in Massachusetts. Id. at 678 n. 7, 481
N.E.2d at 1352, n. 7.
27" Id. at 672, 481 N.E.2d at 1349. Leigh was seeking review of the Board's decision for
a second time. Id.
27" Id. at 685, 481 N.E.2d at 1356. The court set aside the Board's decision and remanded
because it was unable to determine on which basis the Board's decision rested. Id.
2" Id. at 679, 481 N.E.2d at 1353.
2"' Id, at 685, 481 N.E.2d at 1356.
282 Leigh II, 399 Mass. at 559, 506 N.E.2d at 92.
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to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 283 Leigh argued
that the Nurse Practice Act violates the equal protection guarantees
of the Constitution by restricting nurses from attending home births
as lay midwives without similarly restricting lay midwives who are
not nurses. 284
In Leigh II, the court held that Leigh was not deprived of her
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. 285
 The court
reasoned that the classifications made by the statute could rationally
further a legitimate state purpose. 28u The court analyzed the clas-
sifications of home birth versus hospital birth and lay midwife versus
nurse-midwife in determining that Leigh was not deprived of her
constitutional right to equal protection. 287
 The court affirmed the
Board's decision suspending Leigh's license to practice as a regis-
tered nurse. 288
 Thus, in Massachusetts, lay midwifery is a legal but
unregulated profession while nurse-midwives are regulated by the
Board of Registration in Nursing and prohibited from attending
home births. The status of a nurse, while not clear, seems to be
analagous to that of a nurse-midwife. 289
Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has been re-
luctant to overturn the Massachusetts midwifery statute on the basis
4"Y
244
 Brief for Appellant at 30, Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558,
506 N.E2d 91 (1987) (No. 4173). See. Leigh IL 399 Mass. at 560-61,506 N.E.2d at 93. Leigh
argued that this treatment of the Nurse Practice Act created three classifications of midwives
(nurse-midwives, lay midwives who are also nurses, and non-nurse lay midwives) in addition
to obstetricians, Brief for Appellant at 30. Leigh additionally argued that the statute uncon-
stitutionally infringed on pregnant women's due process rights and that the statute created
an illegal restraint of trade under both federal and state law. Leigh II, 399 Mass. at 561-64,
506 N.E.2d at 93-95. This note does riot address Leigh's last two arguments.
2" Id. at 560-61,506 N.E.2d at 93.
Y"" Id. The court first postulated the encouragement of hospital births as a legitimate
state purpose. The court secondly noted that the public expects a nurse "to have undergone
a higher Level of training than a lay midwife." For this reason the "State has a legitimate
purpose in assuring a minimum level of training and competence in nurses licensed by the
board so that consumers may rely on the board certification in making informed decisions
about health care." Id.
The court concluded that the Nurse Practice Act, by requiring hoard certification of all
nurses who practice as midwives, rationally furthers both legitimate state purposes. Id. The
court did not specifically address, nor did this case raise, the issue of a nurse practicing as a
lay midwife and not informing patients of his or her nursing status.
s"7
	 at 560-61,506 N.E.2d at 93.
2" Id. at 564,506 N.E.2d at 95.
2 • In other words Massachusetts nurses must be certified as nurse-midwives to attend
births as midwives and could not attend home births prior to June 1987. In June 1987 the
Massachusetts legislature amended the Nurse Practice Act to allow nurse-midwives to attend
home births. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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of equal protection. In Massachusetts, a nurse who informs clients
that she is a.nurse may not practice lay midwifery. The Tennessee
Court of Appeals indicated, in dicta, however, that it might invali-
date a midwifery statute which allowed non-nurses to practice lay
midwifery but prohibited nurses from practicing lay midwifery. In
Tennessee, a nurse who does not inform his or her clients that he
or she is a nurse may practice lay midwifery. Courts, therefore, have
reached conflicting conclusions over a nurse's capacity to practice
as a lay midwife. Because courts reach conflicting conclusions re-
garding a nurse's practice of lay midwifery, the status of a nurse
practicing lay midwifery is unclear and nurses, for that reason, may
refuse to function as lay midwives. At the same time the lay public
may be left with individual lay midwives whose qualifications may
be difficult to determine. Even though midwifery statutes may reach
inconsistent results, courts have not invalidated midwifery statutes
on equal protection grounds. State legislatures may need to regulate
lay midwifery more rationally to provide safe birth options for
women and infants.
III. TOWARDS CONSISTENT REGULATION OF MIDWIFERY
Throughout history, midwives have been the usual childbirth
attendants. 29° Obstetricians have gradually replaced midwives in the
United States as the typical attendants at childbirth during the last
seventy-five years. 29 ' Obstetricians generally support hospital births,
arguing that they are safer than home births. 292 Because Of this
view, a decrease in the number of home births has correlated with
the increase in the number of obstetrician-attended births. 293
in recent years this trend has reversed. Increasing numbers of
women are choosing home births, usually midwife-attended home
births. 294 Because of these recent trends, states must address this
trend in their regulatory schemes.
In regulating midwifery and home births, state legislatures
need to consider that the relative safety of hospital births and home
births is unclear:293 Possibly as a result of this ambiguity, legislatures
have enacted, and the courts have validated, a number of regulatory
29° DONEGAN, Supra note I 1, at 9. See TOWLER, supra note 71, at 12.
291 See supra notes 118-133 and accompanying text.
292 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 147-173 and accompanying text.
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schemes. 29° Texas regulates both nurse-midwives and lay midwives,
allowing both groups to attend home births. 207 In contrast, lay mid-
wifery is legal but unregulated in Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Mas-
sachusetts. 298 Although nurse-midwives are regulated in these three
states, until recently all three states prohibited nurse-midwives from
attending home births. 2""
While the legal status of nurse-midwives is clear in Wisconsin,
Tennessee, and Massachusetts, the status of nurses practicing lay
midwifery is far from clear. In Leggett, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals held that a nurse, who did not represent herself as a nurse,
could practice lay midwifery without risking the loss of her nursing
license."°° The Leggett court indicated, in dicta, that revoking a
nurse's license for the practice of lay midwifery might violate equal
protection."' The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court in Leigh
II, however, held that disciplining a nurse, who represented herself
as a nurse, for functioning as a lay midwife at home births did not
violate equal protection."2 Thus, because Wisconsin, Tennessee,
and Massachusetts do not regulate lay midwifery but regulate nurse-
midwifery, a nurse practicing lay midwifery risks losing his or her
nursing license.
Because courts have not invalidated regulatory schemes for
midwifery, legislatures must address the irrational results produced
by failing to regulate lay midwifery and by prohibiting nurse-mid-
wives from attending home births. Such a regulatory scheme is
irrational because it leaves women selecting home births with only
21" See supra notes 17.1-78, 250-89 and accompanying text.
2" I See supra notes 209-221 and accompanying text. Because the requirements to practice
as a lay midwife differ From the requirements to practice as a nurse-midwife, a nurse might
choose to practice as a lay midwife instead of as a nurse-midwife. Texas courts could interpret
these statutes to allow a nurse this choice.
2" See supra notes 185-208 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
Although Massachusetts nurse-midwives may now attend home births, Wisconsin and
Tennessee nurse-midwives still may not attend home births. Any unregulated person in
Wisconsin and Tennessee, however, can attend a home birth as a lay midwife. Concurrently
prohibiting nurse-midwives from attending home births reaches the illogical result of allowing
people with debatable training and skills to attend home births while at the same time
prohibiting professionals with training and skills from doing the same. In June 1987, the
Massachusetts legislature changed this illogical result by amending the Nurse Practice Act to
allow nurse-midwives to attend home births. 1987 Mass. Adv. Legis. Scrv. 182 (Law. Co-op.).
Wisconsin and Tennessee have yet to follow suit.
3"" 617 S.W.2d at 481. See supra notes 259-67 and accompanying text.
5''' 617 S.W.2d at 481,
502 390 Mass. at 560-61, 506 N.E.2c1 at 93. See supra notes 268-89 and accompanying
text.
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questionably qualified midwives. While the midwifery regulatory
schemes of Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massachusetts will pass con-
stitutional scrutiny, these regulatory schemes cannot be justified
merely on this basis. The Texas regulatory scheme for midwifery,
especially the Texas lay midwifery statute, is a possible model for
the regulation of midwifery.
Unlike Texas, the midwifery regulatory schemes of Wisconsin,
Tennessee, and Massachusetts do not address the regulation of lay
midwives. Because the regulatory schemes of Wisconsin, Tennessee,
and Massachusetts are so similar, the Leggett and Leigh II cases raise
serious questions about the legal status of nurses in these states who
function as lay midwives outside of their nursing practice. These
states regulate nurse-midwifery as a nursing specialty with certifi-
cation requirements, such as education and experience, which are
in addition to those requirements for a nursing license. 303
In Leigh II, the midwife challenged the Massachusetts Nurse
Midwifery Statute" as violative of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Janet Leigh argued that although she
represented herself as a nurse with obstetrical experience, she was
practicing lay midwifery outside her nursing role. 305 She stated that
to create three classifications of midwivess" and prevent only those
midwives with a, nursing license from attending home births created
an unfair classification. 307 Leigh argued that equal protection re-
quired the legislature to prohibit lay midwives from attending home
births if it prohibits individuals licensed to practice nursing from
attending home births. 308 She additionally contended that the leg-
islature could not prevent lay midwives who are nurses from at-
tending home births if lay midwives can attend home births without
violating equal protection.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected Leigh's
equal protection arguments. As a result, Leigh II created three po-
tential classifications of midwives in Massachusetts. These classifi-
cations are lay midwives, nurse-midwives, and nurses practicing as
'"1 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, §§ 80C, 80D (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-7-207 (1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 33-339 (West 1988).
3°4 Mass. GEN. L. ch. 112, §§ 80C, 80D (1986).
'° See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
'°6 These classifications are lay midwives, nurse-midwives, and lay midwives who practice
outside their separate status as a nurse. Brief for Appellant at 30, Leigh v. Board of Regis-
tration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 506 N.E.2d 91 (1987) (No. 4173).
3°7 1d.
3°3 Id.
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lay rniclwives. 30" While the Leigh' II court held that these classifica-
tions did not violate equal protection, it did not undertake a detailed
constitutional analysis of Massachusetts' regulation of midwifery. 31 °
To determine whether the classifications of lay midwives created by
Leigh II violate equal protection, it is necessary to determine if these
classifications further a legitimate state purpose.;"
The Leigh II court surmised two hypothetical purposes, 312 both
of which seem to be legitimate. The first purpose is to protect the
health and safety of its citizens. States regulate health care profes-
sionals, including nurses, to protect the health and safety of their
citizens. Insuring that licensed nurses function within their state
defined roles is a legitimate state objective. Prescribing requirements
for education and experience prior to receiving a license to practice
nursing and disciplining nurses who function outside their defined
roles assure the public that licensed nurses possess at least a minimal
level of competence.
The second set of purposes relate to the plausible state objective
of encouraging hospital births. While studies evaluating the safety
of home birth as opposed to hospital birth are far from conclu-
sive, 3 " the state could reasonably conclude that it should encourage
hospital births until the safety issues are clearly decided. 3 " Thus, a
court or legislature could advance two conceivable, legitimate state
purposes for the nurse-midwifery statute, ensuring the quality of
licensed nurses and discouraging home births.
The next step in the equal protection analysis is to determine
if a rational relationship exists between these legitimate state objec-
tives and the methods the statute employs to achieve them. 315 Two
arguments can be made in opposition to a rational relationship. The
first is one of under-inclusiveness, 316 that the legislature prevents
"g It can also be argued that Leigh created only"two classifications of midwives: those
who are licensed nurses and those who are not.
31° See Leigh II, 399 Mass. at 560-61,506 N.E.2d at 93.
3n See supra notes 225-231 and accompanying text.
"2 No actual purpose is articulated in the nurse-midwifery statute itself, or its legislative
history. Some critics would argue that this fact alone invalidates the nurse-midwifery statute.
See supra note 236.
313 See supra notes 147-173 and accompanying text.
314 The legislature prohibited nurse-midwives from attending home births prior to re-
vision of the Nurse Practice Act in June 1987. One could question the political forces that
enter into this decision: MDs, GNMs, and hospitals. The health care industry is alive and
well in Massachusetts. It is both politically active and vocal.
"3 See supra notes 240-49 and. accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
516	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:477
nurses from attending home births and it does not similarly burden
lay midwives. The second, and stronger argument, is one of over-
inclusiveness, 3 " that the legislature burdens a nurse practicing mid-
wifery as a lay midwife in addition to burdening a nurse practicing
midwifery as a nurse-midwife.
It is unlikely that a court, on the basis of under-inclusiveness,
would invalidate a statute prohibiting nurse-midwives from attend-
ing home births while not similarly restricting lay midwives. 918 The
United States Supreme Court has not imposed a requirement for a
legislature to attack all aspects of a situation at once."° Rather, the
Court has allowed legislatures to proceed one step at a time. 32° The
Massachusetts legislature's goal may be to regulate all midwifery.'"
Regulating only nurse-midwives, therefore, is a step towards this
goal. Thus, although the state may unfairly burden nurse-midwives
in relation to lay midwives, such a regulatory scheme passes consti-
tutional scrutiny under Supreme Court precedent.
The argument of over-inclusiveness, that the nurse-midwifery
statute burdens a nurse practicing as a lay midwife in addition to
burdening a nurse practicing as a nurse-midwife, is more likely to
appeal to a court's sense of fairness. 322 In the Leigh II case the
midwife, however, informed her patients of her status as a nurse
with obstetrical training. 323 Because of this representation, Janet
Leigh brought herself under the restrictions of the Nurse Practice
Act."' The state of Massachusetts has a legitimate interest in en-
suring that its nurses, holding themselves out as nurses, adhere to
917 See supra note 246.
318 See supra note 243 and accompanying text
313 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
"0 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
321 Additionally, the legislature reasonably could have concluded from Commonwealth
v. Porn that midwifery was illegal in Massachusetts except as subsequently changed by statute.
196 Mass. 326, 82 N.E. 31 (1907). The legislature enacted the nurse-midwifery statute to
allow nurses to practice in the expanded role of nurse-midwife. The legislature limited this
practice to hospitals or licensed birth centers. See supra notes 204-06. Thus, the legislature
impliedly determined that nurse-midwives, the only legal midwifery, could not attend home
births.
Alternatively, the legislature could have concluded that it was unnecessary for it to
address the issue of home births attended by lay midwives if there were a relatively insignif-
icant number of lay midwives within Massachusetts.
022 See supra note 246.
823 Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 395 Mass. 670, 673, 481 N.E.2d 1347,
1349 (1985) (Leigh I).
224 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 74-81C (1986).
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the rules and regulations of the profession of which they are li-
censed mernbers. 32'
Articulating a legitimate state purpose for distinguishing be-
tween lay midwives and lay midwives who practice an additional
profession, nursing, independent of their lay midwifery practice is
far more difficult. 32" While the Leigh II court intimated that these
classifications would pass constitutional scrutiny, 327 the Leggett court,
in dicta, expressed its doubt. 328 One possible state purpose might
be to discourage consumers from using lay midwives as birth atten-
dants. The legislature could conclude that lay midwives generally
are not adequately trained. Allowing nurses to function as lay mid-
wives, arguably, would give the public a false sense of confidence
in the skills of lay midwives. Alternatively, the legislature could
decide that because nurses can function as midwives, the role of a
nurse-midwife is too similar to the role of a lay midwife to allow
nurses to function as lay midwives. Allowing a nurse to function as
a lay midwife merely allows, arguably, a nurse to circumvent nursing
regulations. Thus, although articulating a legitimate purpose for
distinguishing between lay midwives who are nurses and lay mid-
wives who are not nurses is difficult, one can postulate two arguable
purposes for this distinction which rationally relate to these classi-
fications.
A midwifery regulatory scheme which regulates nurse-mid-
wives but fails to regulate lay midwives, as applied to the facts of
the Leigh cases, passes minimum rationality. A court could surmise
two legitimate state purposes for such a regulatory scheme. Addi-
tionally, a court could postulate several reasonable relationships that
could exist between the legislature's purpose and the midwifery
classifications adopted.
Therefore Massachusetts, prior to the June 1987 amendment
to the nurse-midwifery statute, treated midwife attendance at home
births in a variety of ways, depending on which of the previous
classifications applied to the midwife. A case analogous to Leigh 11
arising in Wisconsin or Tennessee might reach similar results be-
• 2r. Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 399 Mass. 558, 500-61, 506 N.E.2d 91,
93 (1987) (Leigh 11).
"" See Leggett v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 612 S.W.2(1476, 480 (1981) (dictum).
IV Leigh II, 399 Mass. al 560-61, 506 N.E.2d at 93.
"" Leggett, 612 S.W.2d at 980. One can distinguish these cases factually. In Leigh II, the
nurse told her midwifery clients that she was a nurse. In Leggett, the nurse did not disclose
her nursing status to her clients and therefore was not subject to itursiog regulations.
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cause Wisconsin and Tennessee regulate midwifery like Massachu-
setts did prior to June 1987. As a result of the Leigh II decision, a
nurse-midwife clearly could not attend a home birth prior to June
1987. A lay midwife could attend any home birth, with or without
training, with or without education, and without any regulations
protecting public health and safety. A lay midwife who was a nurse,
and informed her clients of that fact, could not attend home births.
Thus, Wisconsin and Tennessee could adopt the rationale of Leigh
II resulting in three classifications of midwives, because they regu-
late midwifery similar to the way Massachusetts regulated midwifery
prior to June 1987.
While a legislature's method of achieving its plausible objectives
by creating three classifications of midwives is rational, a legislature's
wisdom in doing so is highly debatable. Prohibiting nurses from
practicing lay midwifery in addition to nursing is unfair to both the
public and nurses who wish to practice as lay midwives. Allowing
lay midwives unrestricted practice in the home birth environment,
without any assurance as to their training and education, is a poor
way to discourage home births:329 or the use of lay midwives.
Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massachusetts need to recognize
and regulate lay midwifery, in addition to nurse-midwifery. The
regulatory schemes of Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massachusetts, as
they now exist, do not indicate for what midwifery practices their
boards of nursing can revoke a nurse's license. These regulatory
schemes do not indicate clearly if a nursing board can revoke a
nurse's license for practicing lay midwifery without informing
clients of his or her concurrent status as a nurse or if a nursing
board can revoke a nursing license only if the nurse informs lay
midwifery clients of his or her status as a nurse.
Because the status of nurses concurrently practicing unregu-
lated lay midwifery is unclear, the Leggett and Leigh courts may have
Rantz, supra note 2, at 43.
Regardless of' our feelings as physicians, the return to out-of-hospital birth
occurring in this country cannot be stopped. Some third-party carriers are
already encouraging and reimbursing out-of-hospital births and lay midwives
because they are less expensive and very safe. Consumer groups are becoming
better organized and more vocal ....
Already the vast majority of home births in this country are attended by
lay midwives, not nurse-midwives Many of these are skilled, dedicated
people who have had extensive training and experience. However, it is fre-
quently impossible fbr midwives to to get the kind of training and professional
support they need.
Id.
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determined whether the board of nursing could discipline nurses
practicing midwifery based upon what the nurses represented to
their lay midwifery clients. In Leggett, the nurse did not represent
herself as a nurse."" Therefore, the Board of Nursing could not
discipline her for practicing lay midwifery."' In Leigh, the nurse
informed her clients that she was a nurse with obstetrical experi-
ence."2 Because she represented herself as a nurse, the Board of
Registration in Nursing had jurisdiction to discipline Leigh.'"
Legislatures need to clarify the status of nurses practicing lay
midwifery. In regulating lay midwifery, legislatures need to deter-
mine explicitly if nurses can practice as lay midwives. If legislatures
fail to make this provision, courts will continue evaluating a nurse's
capacity to practice lay midwifery on the basis of what he or she
represents to clients. Clearly, this is unpredictable and is not the
best way to ensure that women who choose home births have access
to qualified birth attendants.
Legislatures need to provide women who choose home births
with a way to determine the qualifications of lay midwives. The
regulatory schemes of Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Massachusetts do
not protect consumers of midwifery adequately because these reg-
ulatory schemes fail to provide them with a means to distinguish
qualified lay midwives from unqualified persons. Legislation for lay
midwifery should provide both competency standards and a means
to identify qualified lay midwives.
Legislatures need to enact legislation regulating lay midwives
because increasing the attendance of trained midwives at home
births may, arguably, be a safer and cheaper way to provide ade-
quate maternity care. Other countries have integrated lay midwives
into modern obstetrical care with excellent mortality and morbidity
results."' Legislatures should foster research of alternative birth
practices by enacting appropriate regulatory legislation and funding
studies. Thus, legislatures should address and regulate lay midwi-
fery to clarify the status of nurses functioning as lay midwives, to
provide healthcare consumers with a means to evaluate lay mid-
wives, and to aid in the safety determinations of home birth and
midwife-attended births.
Leggett, 612 S.W.2d at 480.
333 /d, at 481.
3" Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 395 Mass. 670, 673, 481 N.F..2d 1347,
1349 (1985) (Leigh I).
'" See id. at. 564, 981 N.E.2d at 1356.
"" See mu/era notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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An alternative to regulating lay midwives in the home birth
environment would be to outlaw lay midwifery and home births
entirely. 335 Due to the growing demand for midwife-attended home
births, this alternative may have more serious repercussions than
merely addressing the situation directly by regulating lay midwives.
Making home births illegal might cause mothers desiring a home
birth to obtain one illegally from attendants with questionable qual-
ifications. Such a statute would be difficult to enforce. Mothers
desiring a home birth already defy established authorities and the
majority of their peers when they select home as the place to give
birth to a child."6 The risks to mothers and infants are far greater
if states deny them safe alternatives to hospital birth.
Legislatures concerned with the safety of their constituents
should recognize and regulate lay midwives, many of whom practice
professionally, and allow nurse-midwives to attend home births.
Because of the inconclusive data on the relative safety of home birth
versus hospital birth and the element of individual choice involved,
states can best protect the health . and safety of their citizens by
providing a regulatory framework. 337 Regulation of lay midwives
"5
There are ... practical arguments against a statute outlawing home birth.
The consequences of such a law might well be worse than the risks to the
unborn life that the law would be designed to protect. As laws prohibiting
abortions drove women to seek help illicitly, so a law banning home births would
drive that practice underground ....
Even now, with no laws banning home birth on the books, couples who
engage in home births are defying established medical authority. Mothers who
choose this option must surmount many obstacles to obtain competent atten-
dants and adequate hospital backup. If laws were passed, it is foolish to believe
that everyone would obey them. Indeed, such a law would be impossible to
enforce, because mothers desiring home birth would not inform a physician or
go to the hospital. Such a law would certainly decrease the availability of trained
home birth attendants, however. And since unattended home birth is ten times
as risky as home birth attended by a professional, the law might decrease the
number of home births but increase the absolute mortality rate of both infants
and mothers.
Hoff, supra note 2, at 25.
336
"7 Id.
[0]ur moral institutions do nut yield a conclusive answer on the assessment of
risks versus benefits of home birth. The essential conflict is twofold. First, we
lack data about the relative risks in home versus hospital birds. This deficiency
can in principle be corrected by the proper research. Second, in weighing values
or ethical principles in tension — the sanctity of life versus the quality of life
— an ethical dilemma is created that cannot be resolved simply by exposing
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should encompass education, training, practice standards, registra-
tion of lay midwives, and disciplinary procedures, and should spec-
ify whether or not nurses may function as lay midwives outside of
their license to practice nursing.
The Texas lay midwifery statute provides an example of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. ' This statute provides stan-
dards for education and training of lay midwives, a method to
identify qualified lay midwives, guidance as to acceptable practices
a lay midwife may perform, and disciplinary procedures for lay
midwives. 33° The Texas legislature has mandated a study of the
effectiveness of this statute.
Texas, moreover, allows nurse-midwives to attend home
births."° Allowing nurse-midwives to attend home births eliminates
the irrational result of only allowing unregulated, questionably
trained individuals to attend home births when trained and quali-
fied nurse-midwives exist who might be willing to attend home
births if permitted to do so by statute. Therefore, Texas provides
an example of a regulatory scheme which allows nurse-midwives to
attend home births and comprehensively regulates lay midwifery.
Such a regulatory scheme best protects the health and safety of
mothers who are seeking a home birth, and their infants.
CONCLUSION
Home births and midwifery have experienced a revival in the
recent past. States are beginning, and should continue, to regulate
these areas. Legislatures can best protect the safety of mothers and
infants in the home birth environment by allowing them access to
qualified professionals as attendants. Midwives can be safe and ef-
invalid arguments or clarifying facts. Therefore, no sweeping declaration is
possible with respect to the ethics of home births; the decision for or against
must be made on a case-by-case basis....
Home birth does not represent a clear and present danger to the common
good.
Id.
5" See supra notes 209-221 and accompanying text.
;tit' Id.
"" See supra notes 209-221 and accompanying text. This statute, however, does not
specify whether or not nurses may practice as lay midwives as opposed to nurse-midwives.
The Texas courts have not addressed the issue of a nurse practicing as a lay midwife. The
results reached by the Leggett and Leigh courts could occur in Texas. Thus, while Texas
regulates lay midwifery, it has not indicated whether or not a nurse 'nay practice as a lay
midwife,
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fective birth attendants. Regulation of lay midwives, in addition to
nurse-midwives, will provide the public with a means to determine
the qualifications of the attendants they select for home births.
Regulation of lay midwives should encompass education, training,
practice standards, registration of lay midwives, and disciplinary
procedures, and should specify whether or not nurses may function
as lay midwives•outside of their license to practice nursing. Banning
home births will not prevent the selection of home births, but will
only increase the risks associated with them. Recognition and reg-
ulation of all aspects of midwifery is long overdue.
KRISTIN E. MCiNTOSH
